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FUNDING CONDITIONS AND FREE SPEECH FOR 
HIV/AIDS NGOS:  HE WHO PAYS THE PIPER 
CANNOT ALWAYS CALL THE TUNE 
Alexander P. Wentworth-Ping* 
 
The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Act pledges billions of dollars to fund NGOs combating the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic but requires recipients to adopt a policy explicitly 
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.  A possible recipient NGO 
confronts a tough decision: adopt an affirmative statement against 
prostitution and sex trafficking to accept the funds, alienating a vital 
partner in its efforts to eradicate HIV/AIDS; or deny the funds to speak its 
own message, though without the benefit of government assistance.  
Courts are split on whether the Leadership Act’s policy requirement 
places an unconstitutional condition on federal funds that requires grant 
recipients to surrender their First Amendment right to freedom of speech by 
compelling speech and impermissibly discriminating on the basis of 
viewpoint.  This Note addresses the circuit split that has resulted from 
differing conceptions of what constitutes compelled speech, what conditions 
act as a penalty, and what conditions suppress alternate viewpoints.  To 
resolve this split, this Note adopts the framework of analysis used by 
dissenting Judge Chester Straub in the Second Circuit and applies his 
framework to assert that the Leadership Act’s policy requirement 
unconstitutionally denies NGOs the ability to express alternate messages 
with nonfederal funds. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) have greatly impacted society, both as a 
disease and as a source of stigma and discrimination.  In 2009 alone, 
approximately 1.8 million adults and children died of HIV/AIDS.1  As of 
2010, about 33.3 million are infected globally,2 including millions of 
mothers3 and children.4  While epidemic patterns vary, drug use and 
prostitution both continue to be high risk behaviors that exacerbate the 
global HIV epidemic.5 
People infected with HIV continue to be stigmatized, discriminated 
against, and treated unfairly.  The U.N. AIDS program reports that 78 
 
 1. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, Global Report:  UNAIDS Report 
on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2010, at 19 (2010), available at http://www.unaids.org/
globalreport/documents/20101123_GlobalReport_full_en.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 21, 23 tbl 2.2. 
 3. In 2009, approximately 370,000 children were born to mothers infected with HIV. 
Id. at 78. 
 4. As of 2009, 3.4 million children were living with HIV. Id. at 23, 24 fig. 2.5.  Sixteen 
million children have been orphaned by infected parents. Id. 
 5. Id. at 224.  This Note uses the word “prostitute” unenthusiastically, because that 
word implies a situation of choice and agency involved for these women, which statistics 
and evidence suggest is not the case. See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and 
Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13 (1993) (describing the victimization of women in 
prostitution); Nicole Franck Masenior & Chris Beyrer, The US Anti-prostitution Pledge:  
First Amendment Challenges and Public Health Priorities, 4 PLOS MED. 1158, 1159 (2007) 
(briefly describing the controversy over using the term “prostitution”); Julie Bindel, 
Eradicate the Oldest Oppression, GUARDIAN, Jan. 18, 2006, at 28 (detailing the oppressive 
aspects the prostitution has on women).  Instead, words like “the prostituted” or “sex 
worker” will hopefully become more popular.  However, in an effort to be faithful to the 
wording of the statute at issue, this Note will utilize the word “prostitution.” 
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countries—46 percent of reporting countries—acknowledged the existence 
of laws, policies, and regulations that obstructed access to effective HIV 
prevention, treatment, care, and support for population groups at higher risk 
and other vulnerable population groups.6  Likewise, only 46 percent of 171 
reporting countries budget HIV programs for women;7 more than 100 
countries continue to criminalize some form of sex work.8  The increasing 
trend of laws criminalizing the transmission of HIV or the failure to 
disclose one’s HIV status does not support a safe environment for voluntary 
disclosure either.9  Even so, 51 countries, territories, and entities impose 
some form of restriction on the entry, stay, and residence of people living 
with HIV.10 
With the HIV/AIDS epidemic continuing to affect millions, the United 
States, as the world leader in fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic,11 took 
action in 2003 by passing the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act12 (Leadership Act).  The Leadership Act 
pledged billions of dollars to fight against HIV/AIDS, assisting nonprofits, 
foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around 
the world.13  The Leadership Act has one caveat or policy requirement:  
according to section 7631(f), the government would only disburse funds to 
organizations that have “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex 
trafficking.”14 
Despite the government’s goodwill, some NGOs conducting HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment programs have challenged the Policy 
Requirement’s constitutionality.  Courts disagree on whether the Policy 
 
 6. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, supra note 1, at 123. 
 7. Id. at 134. 
 8. Id. at 126.  
 9. Id. at 128.  
 10. Id. at 127 fig. 5.2. 
 11. See HIV/ AIDS, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/hivaids 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (finding that USAID has been at the forefront of the global AIDs 
crisis since 1986, providing lifesaving treatment to more than 3.9 million people, counseling 
for more than 40 million people, care for 9.8 million pregnant women, including mother-to-
child prevention support for 660,000 HIV-infected mothers); see also Remarks on Signing 
the United States Leadership Act Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 
2003, 1 PUB. PAPERS 541 (May 27, 2003) [hereinafter Presidential Remarks], available at 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/74868.htm.  
 12. Pub. L. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7601 (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011)).  Congress later extended funding until 2013. See United States Global 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-293, § 401(a), 122 Stat. 2918, 2966 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 7601 (Supp V. 2011)). 
 13. 22 U.S.C. § 7601. 
 14. This Note refers to this caveat as the “Policy Requirement.” Id. § 7631(f); see infra 
Part I.B.2.  While the Act juxtaposes sex trafficking and prostitution because both perpetuate 
an oppressive sex industry, sex trafficking and prostitution each involve different levels of 
agency, coercion, and slavery. See Kate Butcher, Confusion Between Prostitution and Sex 
Trafficking, 361 LANCET 1983, 1983 (2003); Masenior & Beyrer, supra note 5, at 1159 
(finding that “many organizations disagree with the Act’s equation of all forms of 
prostitution with sex trafficking”).   
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Requirement requires recipient NGOs to surrender their First Amendment 
free speech rights.  The D.C. Circuit upheld the Policy Requirement in 
2007, finding that the Leadership Act did not coerce or force any recipient 
to unwillingly espouse the government’s message.15  The Second Circuit 
disagreed, finding that the Policy Requirement unconstitutionally 
conditioned the receipt of federal funds by failing to leave open alternative 
channels of expression and compelling recipient organizations to speak the 
government’s message.16 
This Note explores the constitutionality of the Leadership Act’s Policy 
Requirement. Like the fabled Pied Piper of Hamelin who charmed a town’s 
rats away in return for a fee,17 is an NGO that accepts government funds 
obligated to play the government’s tune?  Despite Congress’s broad powers 
under the Spending Clause,18 does a funding condition that imposes an 
affirmative speech requirement infringe on constitutionally protected free 
speech?  This Note clarifies and explains how the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine applies to the Policy Requirement.  Part I explains the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions of free speech and outlines the 
Leadership Act’s purpose, text, and effects.  Part II analyzes the different 
standards of review and holdings that form the current split between the 
Second and D.C. Circuits over whether the Leadership Act’s Policy 
Requirement unconstitutionally infringes on a recipient’s free speech.  Part 
III argues that Judge Chester Straub’s dissent in the Second Circuit had the 
best framework for analyzing unconstitutional conditions cases, but applied 
the framework to reach an incorrect conclusion.  Part III concludes that the 
Policy Requirement should be deemed unconstitutional for failing to 
provide an adequate alternate channel for NGOs wishing to refrain from 
speaking an antiprostitution message, and by restricting the recipient’s Free 
Speech outside of the scope of the recipient’s participation in the federally-
funded program. 
I.  U.S. FOREIGN AID, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND 
THE LEADERSHIP ACT 
Part I of this Note explores the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and 
its application to the Leadership Act.  Part I.A traces the evolution of the 
unconstitutional conditions through the courts and proposes a general 
framework for understanding conditional government subsidies on free 
speech.  Part I.B introduces funding conditions for foreign aid and gives a 
brief account of the Leadership Act’s purpose, text, and effects. 
 
 15. See DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 16. See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (Alliance IV), 
651 F.3d 218, 223–24 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012). 
 17. ROBERT BROWNING, THE PIED PIPER OF HAMELIN (1888), available at 
http://www.indiana.edu/~librcsd/etext/piper/text.html. 
 18. See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Understanding Unconstitutional Conditions on the Right to Free 
Speech:  History and Current Analysis 
The Spending Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to “lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”19  While 
this constitutional provision has consistently been found to give Congress 
the power to provide subsidies in order to advance its policy goals,20 the 
spending power does not give Congress absolute discretion to condition 
federal funds.21  When the government does not directly regulate an 
activity, but only implicates those interests through conditions on federal 
spending, a different framework, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
applies.22  The unconstitutional conditions doctrine addresses the 
constitutionality of conditions placed on the receipt of federal funds that 
infringe on the recipient’s constitutional rights.23  Though the doctrine has 
 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 20. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987) (citing Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980), Lau v. Nichols 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974), Ivanhoe 
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958), Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947), and Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 
(1937)).   For the purposes of this Note, government subsidies can be benefits of any type, 
including cash, grants, tax exemptions, in-kind goods or services, or the permission to use 
government facilities for a lower cost. 
 21. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 
47, 59 (2006) (quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass’n., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003)); 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 
583, 593–94 (1926) (finding that “the power of the state . . . is not unlimited”).  
 22. See, e.g., David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions:  Charting Spheres of 
Neutrality in Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 679–80 (1992); Richard 
A. Epstein, Foreword:  Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5–7 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:  The Problem of 
Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV 1293, 1293–95 (1984); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard:  Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 859, 859–60 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413, 1421 (1989). 
 23. Lynn Baker argues that the government creates subsidies with two types of 
conditions:  (1) conditions that present a choice for the recipient between “complying with 
the attached condition and receiving the benefit, or not complying and foregoing receipt of 
the benefit”; and (2) “conditions that automatically disqualify persons who possess some 
immutable characteristic.” Lynn A. Baker, The Price of Rights:  Toward a Positive Theory of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1184, 1189 (1990).  This Note will not 
address the second type of condition, which usually concerns a denial of equal protection 
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments; instead, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
generally only concerns those conditions on government subsidies that present an individual 
with an apparent choice.  For more conditional allocations based on immutable 
characteristics that violate the Equal Protection Clause and Substantive Rights, see Gary 
Feinerman, Unconstitutional Conditions:  The Crossroads of Substantive Rights and Equal 
Protection, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1991). 
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been criticized,24 some scholars remain optimistic about the use of 
conditional government subsidies.25 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of 
checking government conditional power,26 it has provided four constraints 
on conditional government subsidies.  The first constraint, derived from the 
language of the Constitution, provides that the spending power must be in 
pursuit of “the general welfare.”27  Courts, however, have deferred to 
congressional judgment to make that conclusion.28  The second constraint 
requires Congress to unambiguously and clearly denote the condition.29  
This constraint enables the recipient to make an informed free choice, aware 
of the decision’s consequences.30  Similar to the first, however, courts have 
found that government subsidies easily comply with this requirement.31  
Third, conditions on federal grants must have a rational relationship to the 
federal interest at stake.32  While this rational relationship test could 
theoretically rein in conditional subsidies by requiring a close nexus 
between the monies and the enumerated interest, courts have applied this 
test with similar deference to the legislature, requiring only a minimal 
showing of a rational relationship.33  In South Dakota v. Dole,34 the Court 
admitted that the third “relatedness” constraint had never been defined, but 
found that receiving federal highway funds was sufficiently related to the 
condition that the legal drinking age be twenty-one years old.  
 
 24. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is An 
Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. 
REV. 593 (1990). 
 25. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) 
(arguing that conditional subsidies can be used to change societal norms and values); Robert 
C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) (analyzing how a democratic 
state can achieve its goals through subsidizing speech).  
 26. See Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926). 
 27. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1, 65 (1936); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 28. See e.g., Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Butler, 297 U.S. at 65.  The Court has even 
questioned whether this restriction is even judicially enforceable given the level of deference 
given to Congress. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) (citing Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976)). 
 29. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See, e.g., FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08. 
 32. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion) 
(finding that federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated “to the federal interest 
in particular national projects or programs”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 
U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (“[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable 
conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (finding that “conditions on federal grants might be 
illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or 
programs’” (quoting Massachusetts, 485 U.S. at 461 (1971))); Lawrence Cnty v. Lead-
Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269–70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 
(1976).  The Supreme Court has likewise required a close nexus between the purpose of a 
government benefit and the condition for takings. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 
U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 34. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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Consequently, the Court declined to “address whether conditions less 
directly related to the particular purpose of the expenditure might be outside 
the bounds of the spending power.”35  Despite Justice O’Connor’s finding 
that the majority had misapplied the relatedness test,36 lower courts have 
found this rational-relation test to be toothless.37 
Because the other requirements have become mostly irrelevant, the 
Constitution provides the main limitation on conditional subsidies.38  Any 
government exchange of some benefit, usually a grant or a tax exemption 
for the waiver of any part of a constitutional right, triggers the doctrine.39  
This includes a subsidy conditioned on any requirement that infringes on 
the recipient’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech.40  The 
unconstitutional conditions framework is irrelevant, however, when the 
freedom of speech is merely implicated or affected; the condition must 
cause a violation of the underlying First Amendment right.41  Thus, the 
purpose of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to determine when a 
subsidy condition infringes on a recipient’s First Amendment rights.42  
When the condition does not violate a right, then no unconstitutional 
 
 35. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09 n.3. 
 36. Id. at 213–14 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (finding that “establishment of a minimum 
drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so 
conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose”). 
 37. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(finding that a Child Enforcement Program condition had a “sufficient relationship to the 
purpose of the federal funding so as to pass constitutional muster” without further 
analysis); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 366, 376 (E.D. Va. 1998) 
(providing only limited analysis of the relatedness prong by saying “[t]he Court finds that 
[the statutory provisions at issue] easily satisfy this requirement, and Defendant does not 
argue otherwise”); see also Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole:  
Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How A Too-Clever Congress 
Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 463 (2003) (finding that none of the restrictions 
have much “bite”). But see Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 
(2012) (declining to extend the Dole framework, though noting its “permissive reading” 
when considering conditional subsidies). 
 38. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 
333 n.34 (1968).  While other amendments can constrain government subsidies as well, this 
Note will focus exclusively on conditions that infringe on the freedom of speech in the First 
Amendment.  For more on other types of unconstitutional conditions, see Baker, supra note 
23, at 1187 (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine with reference to “public 
assistance” and the general welfare); William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of 
Unconstitutional Conditions:  The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
243 (1989); Michael W. McConnel, Unconstitutional Conditions:  Unrecognized 
Implications of the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989). 
 39. See Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1421–22. 
 40. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (finding that the government 
“may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected 
interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”); see also FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 59 
(2006) (recognizing Congress’s limited ability to condition funds that limit freedom of 
speech). 
 41. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d 218, 244 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 
127 (2d Cir. 2012); FAIR, 547 U.S. at 59–60 (not addressing the unconstitutional conditions 
issue because no underlying constitutional violation would occur even under a direct 
restriction). 
 42. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 244 (quoting FAIR, 547 U.S. at 59). 
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conditions problem arises and the conditional subsidy is presumed 
constitutional.43  When the condition does violate the right, then the 
condition is presumed unconstitutional.44 
The unconstitutional doctrine case law for subsidies related to speech has 
many different justifications and lines of reasoning.  The rest of Part I.A 
will help to clarify those cases.  First, it describes some of the First 
Amendment doctrine relevant when considering whether a conditional 
subsidy infringes on the underlying First Amendment right and explains 
how the viewpoint-based distinction has become a relevant factor to the 
analysis.  Next it considers those conditional subsidy cases that have 
examined whether the condition acts as a coercive penalty.  Finally it 
discusses those subsidy cases that have based their holding on whether the 
speech can be considered government speech. 
1.  The Viewpoint Discrimination-Based Analysis of Conditional Subsidies 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law abridging 
the freedom of speech.”45  First Amendment rights have been found to 
include both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking.46  The Supreme Court has even found that compelled speech 
should be treated no differently than compelled silence.47  Regardless of its 
distinction, the right to communicate one’s views has never been absolute; 
restraints on free expression may be “permitted for appropriate reasons.”48 
 
 43. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (finding that the constitutional limits of the spending 
power are less demanding when the regulation is indirect); Regan v. Taxation With 
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (finding that heightened scrutiny was not 
warranted for all conditions that “‘affect[] First Amendment rights’” (quoting Taxation With 
Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982))); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 
513, 518 (1958) (noting that the denial of a tax exemption could infringe on free speech). 
 44. While the Supreme Court has never applied a heightened standard, the standard 
applied depends on the substantive right being infringed upon. See supra note 31 and 
accompanying text.  Speech limitations are scrutinized differently depending on a number of 
different factors under the First Amendment. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 46. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects the right to speak and the “right to refrain from speaking at all”).  The 
Supreme Court has intimated that the government may even be held to a higher standard 
when restricting the right to refrain from speaking. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (“It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be 
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.”).  Both Wooley 
and Barnette dealt with state laws that punished those from refraining to speak. See Wooley, 
430 U.S. at 709; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633, 642 (declaring unconstitutional a state law 
requiring children to salute the flag). 
 47. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (finding the 
distinction between compelled speech and compelled silence “without constitutional 
significance”). 
 48. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976).  Hugo Black famously disagreed, though 
the Supreme Court never accepted his view. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 880 (1960) (finding that the plain language of the Constitution shows 
that the First Amendment did not contain “any qualifications”). 
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a.  The Government’s Content-Neutrality Mandate 
Two distinctions have been critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
government restrictions on freedom of speech.  First, the Supreme Court 
has differentiated between content-based and content-neutral restrictions.  
Content-based restrictions inhibit expression based on its message, whereas 
content-neutral restrictions apply to all speech regardless of viewpoint.49  
Government content-based restrictions are consequently presumed 
invalid,50 and must pass strict scrutiny, whereas content-neutral restrictions 
need only pass intermediate scrutiny.51 
When the government seeks to prohibit speech directly, the First 
Amendment demands neutrality toward content52 and viewpoint53 because 
government regulation “may not favor one speaker over another.”54  
Viewpoint restrictions are presumed unconstitutional because they “raise[] 
the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or 
viewpoints from the marketplace”55 or “indoctrinate the citizenry.”56  Any 
attempt by the government “aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas” is 
presumptively beyond the power of the government to curtail.57 
 
 49. Viewpoint discrimination is defined as speech regulation based on “the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker,” and as “an egregious form 
of content discrimination.” Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 50. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based 
regulations are presumptively invalid.”); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 
640–41 (1994). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 932–41 (3d ed. 2006). 
 51. The strict scrutiny test finds constitutional only those laws that are narrowly tailored 
to a substantial government interest.  The less rigorous intermediate scrutiny standard 
upholds only laws that are substantially related to an important government interest.  The 
rational basis standard finds constitutional those laws that are rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.  For more on standards of review for First Amendment 
claims, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 933–41 (describing content-neutrality, strict 
scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny). 
 52. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“But, above all 
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message . . . or its content.”); see also Cole, supra note 22, at 680–81; 
Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 105–10 (1996). 
 53. See, e.g., City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) 
(“[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some 
viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.”); see also Cole, supra note 22, at 680–81. 
 54. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828. 
 55. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991). 
 56. Cole, supra note 22, at 681. 
 57. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)); see also Nicole B. Cásarez, Public Forums, Selective 
Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 503 
(2000). 
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b.  Public Forum Doctrine 
The Court has also drawn distinctions based on the places available for 
the speech.58  Because speech requires a place to be heard, the Court has 
generally distinguished between two types of government property where 
speech can take place:  public and nonpublic forums.59  While public 
forums were traditionally held to be only streets and sidewalks used for 
public communication and assembly,60 the Court now treats all publicly 
owned property basically the same.61  Nonpublic forums are those 
government properties that can be closed to all speech activities.62 
While the Court has never articulated clear criteria for determining 
whether a forum is public or nonpublic, three factors have been particularly 
salient:  whether the particular place is traditionally available for speech,63 
the extent to which speech is incompatible with the usual functioning of the 
place,64 and whether the place’s primary purpose is for speech.65  Thus, the 
basic rule is that a forum is public if the speech occurs at the customary 
time and manner of expression at that location.66 
 
 58. Jess Alderman, Words to Live By:  Public Health, the First Amendment, and 
Government Speech, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 161, 166–68 (2009). 
 59. For more on publicly owned property for speech purposes and under what 
circumstances it can be restricted, see Lillian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum 
Doctrine:  In Defense of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79; Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora 
Americana:  Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233. 
 60. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (finding that public 
forums are places “held in trust for the use of the public . . . for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”). 
 61. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983) 
(discussing the different categories of places accessible for speech purposes).  While an 
additional distinction exists between public forums and designated or limited public forums, 
if the government chooses to allow speech in such a place, all the rules for public forums 
apply equally and the distinction becomes mostly irrelevant. See e.g., Good News Club v. 
Milford Centr. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (finding a content-based restriction 
impermissible when both parties had created a “limited public forum” in a school); see also 
Kaplan v. Cnty. of L.A., 894 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that limited public 
forums are treated as a public forum for First Amendment purposes); CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 50, at 1137–39. 
 62. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 1139–43; cf. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) 
(holding that the government could prohibit speech in the areas outside prisons and jails 
because it was not a public forum). 
 63. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 1143–44; cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 
U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (plurality opinion) (focusing not on whether sidewalks were generally 
available for free speech, but whether sidewalks were available on U.S. Post Office 
property). 
 64. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 1143 (“The greater the incompatibility, the more 
likely that the Court will find the place to be a nonpublic forum.”); cf., Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001) (describing how the government cannot control private 
speech in a medium of expression to “distort its usual functioning”). 
 65. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 1144; cf. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (finding post 
office property was not a public forum because it had not been dedicated to speech 
activities); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) 
(finding that expression is not the primary purpose of airports). 
 66. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 860 (1976) (finding a “flexible approach” to be 
more appropriate); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (finding that 
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Consequently, any speech in a public forum is subject to the content-
neutral “time, place, and manner” restrictions provided to all regulated 
speech.67  In any public forum, the government can only regulate speech 
that reasonably limits disruption to the public space.68  Reasonable 
restrictions must be (1) content-neutral; (2) narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest (i.e., pass strict scrutiny); and (3) leave open 
alternative channels for communication.69  The constitutionality of these so-
called “time, place, and manner” restrictions is mostly contextual.70  While 
these restrictions must be narrowly tailored, they do not necessarily have to 
use the least restrictive alternative.71 
2.  The Analysis of Government Subsidies That Hinge on Whether the 
Condition Coerces or Penalizes 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that the “government 
may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a 
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit 
altogether.”72  This conception of the doctrine has caused courts and 
commentators to consider whether the government uses its conditional 
subsidy power to coerce recipients to engage in unconstitutional activities.73 
 
“[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with 
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time”); see also Stone, supra note 59, 
at 251–52. 
 67. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 
(1981); Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47–48. 
 68. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116. 
 69. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647. 
 70. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 (“The nature of a place, ‘the pattern of its normal 
activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.’” 
(quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 
1042 (1969)); Alderman, supra note 58, at 166; Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on 
the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1042 (1969). 
 71. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) (“[I]t may satisfy the tailoring 
requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the 
statutory goal.”); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (finding that the 
regulation “need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so”). 
 72. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1415.  Sullivan explains:  “Unconstitutional conditions 
problems arise when government offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or 
forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right normally protects from government 
interference.” Id. at 1421–22. 
 73. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (finding a subsidy to be a 
“relatively mild encouragement” rather than  “federal coercion”); Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (considering whether the conditional subsidy passed the 
point where “pressure turns into compulsion”); Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1428–41 
(“Directly and through metaphors of duress or penalty, the Court has repeatedly suggested 
that the problem with unconstitutional conditions is their coercive effect.”). 
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a.  Speiser v. Randall 
Speiser v. Randall74 was one of the first articulations that a conditional 
government subsidy cannot act as a coercive penalty.75  In Speiser, the State 
of California required veterans to sign a loyalty oath stating that they did 
not advocate the violent overthrow of the government in exchange for a 
property exemption.76  The Court found that the condition penalized the 
recipients by coercing them to refrain from constitutionally protected 
speech.77  Though the tax exemption was a “privilege,” the government 
could not deny the tax exemption without unconstitutionally infringing on 
speech.78  Because the conditional subsidy acted as a coercive penalty, the 
statute violated the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.79 
b.  Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington 
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,80 the Court 
upheld a federal statute providing that contributions to an organization are 
tax deductible only if that organization either (1) does not use a substantial 
portion of their contributions for lobbying or (2) is a veterans’ 
organization.81  Even though the First Amendment protects lobbying 
activities,82 the Court found that Congress was not required to subsidize 
lobbying efforts.83 
Two important factors were critical to the Court’s holding:  Congress 
denied Taxation With Representation In Washington (TWR) neither the 
right to receive deductible contributions to support its nonlobbying activity 
nor any independent benefit.84  Even under a least-restrictive means 
analysis, these organizations remained free to receive tax-deductible 
contributions to support non-lobbying activities through their organizational 
affiliates.85  The veterans’ organizations, which could use their 
contributions for lobbying, were tax exempt regardless of their speech’s 
 
 74. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 75. Id. at 518 (“To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of 
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the 
State were to fine them for this speech.”) (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. at 515. 
 77. Id. at 519 (“[T]he denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech 
necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed 
speech.  The denial is ‘frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
 78. See id. at 518 (finding that the fact that “a tax exemption is a ‘privilege’ or ‘bounty’” 
does not mean that “its denial may not infringe speech”). 
 79. Id. at 520–29. 
 80. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
 81. Id. at 543. 
 82. See E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137–
38 (1961). 
 83. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. 
 84. Id. at 545–46. 
 85. Id. at 545; see id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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content.86  Congress was free to make policy choices unless those choices 
infringe on free speech by suppressing a certain viewpoint.87  The Regan 
Court emphasized that Congress had not violated the First Amendment by 
making a policy choice to fund one activity over another.88  Subsidies, the 
Court found, are simply “a matter of grace” that Congress has the power to 
grant or deny as a matter of democratic vote.89  In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Blackmun similarly found that the affiliate structure alleviated any 
problems to the conditional subsidy by allowing nonprofits to speak without 
losing the tax benefits.90  This contrast between permissible nonsubsidies 
and impermissible penalties is not limited to speech, but is a common 
feature of the Supreme Court’s protection of individual liberties from 
government overreaching.91 
c.  FCC v. League of Women Voters of California 
The Supreme Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California92 
struck down a conditional subsidy that penalized protected speech by 
invalidating a law withholding federal funds from public radio and 
television stations that engaged in “editorial broadcasts.”93  In contrast with 
the tax provisions upheld in Regan, the Court emphasized that the 
government had failed to provide an alternative route for expression:  
broadcast stations could not limit the speech conducted with federal funds 
while also pursuing their protected speech funded by nonfederal 
donations.94  Congress need not support all forms of speech, but it cannot 
withdraw funding merely because the recipient uses other nonfederal funds 
to engage in disliked speech, even if federal funding is only a small 
minority of the total contributions.95 
 
 86. Id. at 545 (majority opinion). 
 87. Id. at 549 (noting that Congress’s freedom to “select[] . . . particular entities or 
persons for entitlement to this sort of largesse ‘is obviously a matter of policy and discretion 
not open to judicial review’” (quoting United States v. Reality Co., 163 U.S. 427, 444 
(1896)). 
 88. Id. at 546 (finding that Congress “ha[d] not infringed any First Amendment rights 
. . . [but] ha[d] simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying”). 
 89. Id. at 549 (quoting Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958)). 
 90. Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 91. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 
474 n.8 (1977) (finding that a penalty analysis would lead to strict scrutiny of the conditional 
subsidy for welfare benefits to women).  At least one court placed emphasis on whether the 
funding program has placed any obstacle in the way of the recipient exercising its 
constitutional right. See DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 
289 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that an agency program was constitutional because it placed no 
obstacles in the way of the plaintiff’s funding of abortions). 
 92. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
 93. Id. at 400–01. 
 94. Id. at 400. 
 95. Id. (finding that Congress had not merely refused to subsidize editorializing by 
public broadcasting stations, but rather it had caused a “station that receives only 1% of its 
overall income from [federal] grants [to be] barred absolutely from all editorializing”). 
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Because the condition restricted the station’s speech outside of the scope 
of the recipient’s participation in the government program, the Court found 
the conditional subsidy unconstitutional.96  The Court did, however, 
explicitly note that Congress could have maintained the restriction if it had 
also allowed broadcast stations to establish affiliate organizations to 
editorialize with nonfederal money.97 
d.  Rust v. Sullivan 
Rust v. Sullivan98 similarly distinguished between restricting the 
recipient’s speech funded by the government and restricting all of the 
recipient’s speech.99  In Rust, a Title X100 program provided grants to 
healthcare organizations on the condition that no money would be used on 
abortion-related advocacy.101  The regulations also required grant recipients 
to keep federally-funded activities financially and physically separate from 
prohibited abortion activities.102  The funds were tied exclusively to how 
the recipient used Title X money, not how the recipient used its own non-
Title X funds.103 
Echoing Regan and League of Women Voters, the Rust Court upheld the 
regulations, finding that the subsidy condition did not restrict the recipient’s 
First Amendment speech outside of the scope of the government 
program.104  The Rust Court similarly found that Congress had not denied 
any recipient its constitutional right to engage in pro-abortion related 
speech or activism by refusing to fund abortion-related activities and by 
requiring some institutional separation and integrity.105 
 
 96. Id. (“The station has no way of limiting the use of its federal funds to all 
noneditorializing activities, and, more importantly, it is barred from using even wholly 
private funds to finance its editorial activity.”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 99. See id. at 197. 
 100. The Title X Family Planning Program, enacted under President Richard Nixon in 
1970 as part of the Public Health Service Act, is the only federal grant program solely 
dedicated to family planning and reproductive health services for low-income and uninsured 
patients. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-8.  
 101. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178. Specifically, the condition barred grant-receiving programs 
from providing abortion counseling, referring pregnant women to abortion providers, 
lobbying for legislation, or otherwise advocating for measures that would increase the 
availability of abortion. See id. at 196. 
 102. Id. at 180–81. 
 103. Id. at 198–99. 
 104. Id. at 196 (“The Secretary’s regulations do not force the Title X grantee to give up 
abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate 
and distinct from Title X activities.”) (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. at 198. 
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e.  United States v. American Library Association 
The latest chapter in this line of conditional cases was United States v. 
American Library Association Inc.,106 where the Supreme Court upheld a 
law that conditioned public library funding on the installation of filter 
software to block access to inappropriate material on library computers.107  
The American Library Court echoed Rust, Regan, and League of Women 
Voters, and found that a mere refusal to fund a protected activity is not a 
penalty.108  The Supreme Court continued its trend of upholding 
government subsidies because the recipient could freely accept the 
conditional subsidy or find alternate means of funding.109  If adequate 
alternative channels for protected expression are available, Congress can 
conditionally restrict the First Amendment rights of the recipients without 
the restriction being considered a coercive penalty.110 
While the Court has stressed the availability of alternate independent 
means of funding, seldom has the Court inquired into whether the 
independent alternate means of funding actually exists.  In American 
Library, for example, the Court found that the program did not deny the 
libraries their right to provide unfiltered internet access,111 but failed to 
consider that no alternate means of funding actually existed.  The League of 
Women Voters Court, however, found that because the station received only 
one percent of its funds from nonfederal sources, the refusal to subsidize 
editorializing amounted to a penalty because effectively no other source of 
funding existed.112  A recipient program’s reliance on federal funding may 
be yet another variable in the calculus to be explored further in the future. 
 
 106. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 107. Id. at 200–01, 214. 
 108. See id. at 200–01. 
 109. See id. at 212 (“To the extent that libraries wish to offer unfiltered access, they are 
free to do so without federal assistance.”); Rust, 500 U.S. at 199 n.5 (“[S]ubsidies are just 
that, subsidies. The recipient is in no way compelled to operate a Title X project; to avoid the 
force of the regulations, it can simply decline the subsidy.” (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 
465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984))); cf. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings 
Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 (2010) (finding that plaintiffs were not 
coerced to modify its membership policies in order to receive state funding); Guardians 
Ass’n  v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 596 (1983) (finding that the receipt of 
conditional federal funding “is a consensual matter:  the State or other grantee weighs the 
benefits and burdens before accepting the funds and agreeing to comply with the conditions 
attached to their receipt”). 
 110. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212 (finding that Congress’s decision not to 
subsidize the activity could not be considered a penalty); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 
164 F.3d 757, 766 (1999) (“Congress may burden the First Amendment rights of recipients 
of government benefits”); see also Brooklyn Legal Servs. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 
219, 231 (2006). 
 111. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212. 
 112. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984). 
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3. The Analysis of Conditional Subsidies Based on 
Government Speech and Public Forums 
The government speech doctrine, however, considers what messages the 
government can support either by communicating its own message or 
subsidizing speech for another.  The First Amendment and public forum 
doctrine recognize that the government must permit some speech on public 
property without content discrimination, but can restrict other property from 
public speech use altogether.113  Because any attempt by the government to 
suppress an unpopular idea is considered unconstitutional,114 the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized maintaining viewpoint neutrality.115  
While the Speiser and Regan Courts followed this logic by finding 
conditional subsidies to be unconstitutional if based on viewpoint 
discrimination,116 they never used the language of the government being 
able to control the message it seeks to convey or support. 
a.  Rust v. Sullivan 
Rust v. Sullivan was the seminal case establishing the government speech 
doctrine.  In addition to considering whether the conditional subsidy was 
coercive,117 the Court considered whether the Title X regulations on family 
planning grants were unconstitutionally viewpoint-based.118  Like Regan, 
the Court found no viewpoint discrimination because the government can 
choose to encourage certain activities by funding one program without also 
funding an alternate program dealing with the problem in another way.119  
 
 113. See supra Part I.A.1.b. 
 114. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Regan v. 
Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)); Rosenberger v. Rector 
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (“[I]deologically driven attempts to 
suppress a particular point of view are presumptively unconstitutional in funding, as in other 
contexts.”); Regan, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983). 
 115. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) 
(stating that “viewpoint neutrality. . . . underlies the First Amendment”); Police Dep’t of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[The] government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (invalidating a school’s compulsory flag 
salute as a government attempt to impose a favored viewpoint).  For more on viewpoint 
discrimination, see Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 
105–10 (1996), and Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 
(1987). 
 116. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (finding conditional subsidies 
unconstitutional if aimed at the “suppression of dangerous ideas”); Regan, 461 U.S. at 548 
(same). 
 117. See infra Part I.A.2.d. 
 118. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991). 
 119. Id. at 193 (finding that the government had “merely chosen to fund one activity to 
the exclusion of the other”). 
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Conditional encouragement of an activity prompts an entirely different 
analysis from direct state regulation.120 
Because the government must choose what messages, programs, and 
projects to fund, certain programs will always be chosen and funded to the 
exclusion of others based on the viewpoints expressed.  Though the 
government did make a policy choice in Rust that discriminated by 
viewpoint,121 making that viewpoint-based policy choice was permissible 
because its purpose was not to suppress an unpopular idea.122  The 
government must make policy choices about what activities and services to 
subsidize, though those choices may be based on aesthetic, political, or 
moral viewpoints.123  Instead, the government was ensuring that the grantee 
engaged in activities within the funded project’s scope.124  Thus, when the 
government appropriates public funds to establish a program, it is entitled 
to define the limits of that program’s speech.125 
 
 120. Id. (“There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected 
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative 
policy.”). 
 121. See, e.g., id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The regulations are also clearly 
viewpoint based.”); Robert C. Post, supra note 25, at 170 (“The [Rust] regulations plainly 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (finding that 
viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in situations like in Rust where private 
speakers are used as agents to convey a government-funded program or message); Alliance 
IV, 651 F.3d 218, 250 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011) (Straub, J., dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 678 
F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[The Rust Court’s explanation] may have been another way of 
stating the conclusion that the government had not impermissibly discriminated on the basis 
of viewpoint.”). But see Post, supra note 25, at 170 (finding that Rust discriminated on the 
basis of viewpoint); Ann Brewster Weeks, The Pregnant Silence:  Rust v. Sullivan, Abortion 
Rights, and Publicly Funded Speech, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1661 (1992) (condemning Rust 
for viewpoint discrimination).  The fine line between permissible and impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination for conditional subsidies hinges on whether the viewpoint being 
suppressed is based on a desire to suppress an unpopular idea or a desire to make an 
effective policy choice. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 477 (1977) (finding that the state 
was “not required to show a compelling interest for its policy choice to favor normal 
childbirth”); DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 289 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (finding that deciding not to fund abortion-related activities in NGOs “simply 
represents a policy choice, not an invidious discrimination”); see also Cole, supra note 22, at 
730 n.217 (finding that conditional funding underscores that “neutrality can be imposed in 
varying degrees”). 
 123. See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 613 (discussing the government dilemma of making 
policy choices while still maintaining viewpoint neutrality).  The desire to present a unified 
government message can become even stronger when the issue involves foreign rather than 
domestic affairs. See DKT Mem’l Fund, 887 F.2d at 290 (finding that the government policy 
choices in foreign affairs is consistent with settled precedent and to hold otherwise would 
“work much mischief”); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (citing Doe v. 
Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657 (1853)). 
 124. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. The Rust Court even used a provocative hypothetical to 
illustrate this point. Id. (finding that if Congress established “the National Endowment for 
Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles . . . it was not 
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political 
philosophy such as communism and fascism”). 
 125. Id. 
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The Rust Court did, however, find that government subsidy conditions 
could not always justify content- or viewpoint-based restrictions.126  The 
difference between permissible and impermissible restrictions depended on 
whether the government had created a public forum.127  The government’s 
ability to refuse to grant a speaker access to a forum does not allow the 
government to violate its neutrality mandate.128  If the government creates a 
public forum, certain privileged relationships may be inherently protected 
regardless of government subsidies, but abortion-related speech is not one 
of them.129 
b.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia 
The Court applied Rust’s viewpoint discrimination analysis to a 
government subsidy given to public university student groups in 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,130 where a 
student organization was denied funding when it wanted to publish a 
newspaper that advocated Christian viewpoints.131  Because the 
government had created a “metaphysical” public forum for student speech 
by funding student groups, the State could not exclude speech based on 
viewpoint.132  If the government does use private speakers to convey its 
own message, the government can make viewpoint-based decisions and 
“may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is 
neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”133  Because the University of 
Virginia offered funds to student groups to encourage speech from private 
speakers and intended to facilitate the speech of those private speakers 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 200 (“[T]he university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental 
to the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech within that 
sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is 
restricted.” (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, State Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603, 
605–06 (1967))). 
 128. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) 
(plurality opinion) (finding that the government cannot discriminate once it has created a 
forum for speech); see also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1990) 
(plurality opinion) (holding that once the government “has expressly dedicated [a particular 
forum] to speech activity,” it cannot exclude speakers based upon the content of their 
speech); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1985) (same 
holding); Cole, supra note 22, at 692. 
 129. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194–95; see Cole, supra note 22, at 692 (finding that the Rust 
Court “acknowledged that the doctor-patient relationship might deserve similar first 
amendment protection ‘even when subsidized by the government,’” but found that the Title 
X program was not significantly affected) (citation omitted). 
 130. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 131. Id. at 823–28. 
 132. Id. at 829–30.  Interestingly, the Court distinguished Rosenberger from Rust because 
in Rust the government had used private speakers to transmit its own message for its funded 
program rather than create a forum for private speech. See id. at 833. 
 133. Id. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196–200). 
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through funding, the Court found that the University had created a public 
forum and could not “silence the expression of selected viewpoints.”134 
c.  National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley 
The Court further elaborated on the limitations of the public forum 
doctrine in the context of government subsidies in National Endowment for 
the Arts v. Finley.135  In Finley, Congress had conditioned federal grants to 
artists upon consideration of “general standards of decency and respect for 
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”136  The Court found 
that the conditional funding did not amount to impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination because the government did not “indiscriminately 
‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers’” but instead 
mandated a program with viewpoint-based “esthetic judgments.”137 
d.  Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez 
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,138 the Court struck down a 
conditional subsidy, where the government conditioned the receipt of legal 
assistance funds on a waiver prohibiting any funded assistance to challenge 
existing welfare laws.139  The Court distinguished the case from Rust 
because the private speech was expressly not intended to speak a 
government message.140  The Title X programs in Rust neither created a 
public forum nor distorted the privileged doctor-patient relationship,141 
whereas in Velazquez the regulation had tainted the attorney’s role by 
limiting the ability to challenge potentially illegal welfare statutes and 
interfering with the expression of speech integral to the proper functioning 
of the judiciary.142  The funded program was designed to facilitate private 
speech in a public forum rather than convey a government message.143 
 
 134. Id. at 835. 
 135. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 136. Id. at 586. 
 137. Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834); see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n 
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672–73 (1998) (holding that public forum principles do not 
generally apply to a public television station's editorial judgments regarding the private 
speech presented to viewers). 
 138. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 139. See id. at 537–38, 549.  
 140. Id. at 541–43 (noting that Rust involved the government disbursing funds to support 
a government message whereas the law at issue sought to restrict the private speech of 
lawyers speaking on behalf of indigent clients). 
 141. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 142. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543 (noting that the government sought “to use an existing 
medium of expression,” the lawyer-client relationship, “and to control it, in a class of cases, 
in ways which distort its usual functioning”). 
 143. Id. at 542 (“[T]he [Legal Services Corporation] program was designed to facilitate 
private speech, not to promote a governmental message.”). 
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Additionally, the restriction could be redefined post-enactment to include 
a programmatic government message.144  If private speech is involved, then 
the defined main purpose cannot be aimed at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas.145  The Court did not address whether statutes could have more than 
one main purpose. 
e.  United States v. American Library Ass’n 
United States v. American Library Ass’n146 further clarified the 
distinction between government speech and the public forum doctrine.147  
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion found that internet access in 
public libraries did not constitute a designated public forum deserving of 
strict scrutiny protection because viewpoint-based restrictions are improper 
only “‘when the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal 
of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of 
views from private speakers.’”148  A public forum can only be created by an 
affirmative government decision to create such a forum; however, acquiring 
internet terminals does not create a forum in libraries.149  The law denied a 
benefit to no one by merely insisting that funds be spent for their authorized 
purpose of helping public libraries provide quality educational and 
informational materials.150 
B.  Conditional Foreign Aid & The Leadership Act 
This section describes the contours of government funding in the context 
of foreign aid, specifically the Leadership Act.  It first discusses the limits 
of conditional spending for foreign aid.  It then explains the purpose, text, 
and effects of the Leadership Act of 2003, which conditions funding for 
NGO’s fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the adoption of a policy 
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking. 
1.  Conditional Funding & Foreign Affairs 
While foreign aid has long been considered an instrument or tool of U.S. 
foreign policy, many commentators have concluded that foreign policy is 
inevitably infused with American moral values.151  The promotion of 
 
 144. Id. at 547 (finding that the purpose could not be redefined as “help[ing] the current 
welfare system function in a more efficient and fair manner”). 
 145. Id. at 548–49 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 
540, 548 (1983), and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)). 
 146. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 147. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 207–08 (2003). 
 148. Id. at 213 n.7 (quoting Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542). 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 228–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 151. See generally Nina J. Crimm, The Global Gag Rule:  Undermining National 
Interests by Doing unto Foreign Women and NGOs What Cannot Be Done at Home, 40 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 587, 588–92 (2007); Ernest W. Lefever, Morality Versus Moralism in 
Foreign Policy, in ETHICS AND WORLD POLITICS:  FOUR PERSPECTIVES 1, 11 (Ernest W. 
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American values and foreign policy abroad is nevertheless entwined with 
the pursuit of “national interest.”152  Although the Constitution provides 
Congress and the president shared powers over foreign affairs,153 beginning 
with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the president has been the dominant force 
setting U.S. objectives in foreign policy.154  Congress distributed funds for 
governmental initiatives furthering U.S. foreign policy abroad to many 
agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC).155  USAID, the main agency involved 
in foreign aid, has two interconnected explicit purposes:  (1) to promote 
democracy abroad and (2) to provide foreign aid to the developing world.156 
U.S. foreign aid is really a misnomer because it “has never been an 
unconditional transfer of financial resources.”157  The United States really 
provides assistance subject to conditions and policies intended to serve 
national interests.158  Identical to domestic spending, U.S. foreign aid “may 
attach conditions that ensure use of the resources exclusively for advancing 
the spread and stability of political democracies and free markets, or for 
 
Lefever ed., 1988); Arthur Schlesinger, National Interests and Moral Absolutes, in ETHICS 
AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 151, at 21, 24 (describing the problematic relationship 
between morality and international politics). 
 152. See Lefever, supra note 151, at 12. 
 153. See Richard Grimmett, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress, DEP’T 
ST. BULL., June 1, 1999, http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm (detailing the division of powers 
between Congress and the President in foreign affairs); Nina J. Crimm, Toward Facilitating 
a Voice for Politically Marginalized Minorities and Enhancing Presidential Public 
Accountability and Transparency in Foreign Health Policy Making, 39 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1053, 1080–81 (2006) (discussing the separation of powers in foreign 
policy). 
 154. See LEE H. HAMILTON, A CREATIVE TENSION:  THE FOREIGN POLICY ROLES OF THE 
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 6, 9, 15, 42, 44 (2002) (discussing the increased power of the 
president in the modern era); Crimm, supra note 153, at 1081–85 (discussing the rise of the 
President as the “dominant foreign policymaker”); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The President is the sole organ of the nation in its 
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.” (quoting 10 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 613 (1822))). 
 155. See generally CURT TARNOFF & MARIAN LEONARDO LAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40213, FOREIGN AID:  AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 21–23 
(2011).  International developmental aid also is made available through the U.S. Department 
of State. Id. at 21–22. 
 156. Who We Are, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) 
(“U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America’s 
[foreign policy] interests while improving lives in the developing world. . . .  Spending less 
than 1 percent of the total federal budget, USAID works in over 100 countries” to achieve 
these goals by “protect[ing] human rights” and “improv[ing] global health.”). For more on 
USAID’s mission to spread democracy and advance U.S. foreign policy interests, see 
generally USAID, FOREIGN AID IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST:  PROMOTING FREEDOM, 
SECURITY, AND OPPORTUNITY (2002). 
 157. TERESA HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM 15 (1971) (concluding that the “conditions 
attached to aid are clearly and directly intended to serve the interests of the governments 
providing it”). 
 158. Id. 
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enhancing the health, education, and economic well-being of populations in 
developing countries.”159 
2.  The Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act:  
Enactment, Execution and Effects 
This section outlines one particular example of conditional foreign aid: 
the Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act.  This 
section discusses the congressional history and purpose of the Leadership 
Act; the text of the statute itself; and the effects of the Act on foreign aid, 
the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the response to its implementation. 
a.  The Purpose of the Act 
The United States has been fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic since 
1986.160  The most recent initiatives in the fight against this epidemic began 
in 2001 in response to a declaration in the United Nations that encouraged 
all members to create policies and dedicate aid towards the prevention, 
treatment, and collaboration needed to not only halt but also reverse the 
worldwide HIV/AIDS pandemic.161  President Bush followed suit in his 
2003 State of the Union Address by announcing a comprehensive, five-year 
global strategy to fight HIV/AIDS, which included an Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).162  Under PEPFAR, both USAID and HHS, along 
with five other agencies, implement prevention, care, and treatment 
programs for HIV/AIDS.163  USAID supports implementation through 
direct in-country presence and regional programs, while HHS operates in 
developing countries and conducts research.164  As a part of the HHS, CDC 
assists with surveillance, training, evaluation and implementation of HIV/ 
AIDS prevention, treatment and care by partnering with governments, 
NGOs, international organizations, U.S.-based universities, and the private 
sector.165 
The United States finally joined the United Nations’ global strategy to 
fight HIV/AIDS when Congress passed the Leadership Act on May 21, 
2003.166  The law established the largest financial commitment to 
combating the international HIV/AIDS epidemic ever.167  The Act’s 
 
 159. See Crimm, supra note 151, at 589. 
 160. See supra note 11; see also Presidential Remarks, supra note 11. 
 161. See G.A. Res. S-26/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (June 27, 2001). 
 162. See George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/bushtext_012803.html. 
 163. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. GLOBAL AIDS COORDINATOR, ACTION TODAY, A 
FOUNDATION FOR TOMORROW:  THE PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF 145–
54 (2006), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/60813.pdf. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 22 U.S.C. § 7671(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 167. See 22 U.S.C. § 7601(28)–(29) (2006).  The Leadership Act first dedicated 15 billion 
dollars for the 2004–2008 fiscal years. Id. The current version of the Act provides 48 billion 
dollars over a five-year period beginning on October 1, 2008. Id. § 7671 (Supp. V 2011). 
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purpose was to strengthen U.S. leadership and the effectiveness of the 
country’s response to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.168 
The five-year strategy included several avenues for implementation 
including service delivery,169 improved treatment and prevention programs 
(especially for those at the highest risk for contracting the disease),170 and 
improved technical assistance, training, and research.171  An HIV/AIDS 
Response Coordinator was established to authorize the use of funds,172 to 
combat HIV/AIDS,173 assist children and families,174 and provide expanded 
debt relief.175 
The Act was based on extensive findings.176  It began with both 
general177 and specific178 findings about the extent of the epidemic and then 
focused on addressing its behavioral causes.179  The Act even expresses 
support for the role of private partners and NGOs in fighting HIV/AIDS.180 
The Act also identifies prostitution and sex trafficking181 as one of the 
major behavioral causes and contributing factors to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS and states that a U.S. policy goal is to eradicate prostitution as a 
principal means of combating the spread of the disease.182  While a number 
 
 168. Id. § 7603. 
 169. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-60, § 5(101)(2) at 6 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
712, 712 (emphasizing an approach based on local delivery). 
 170. See 22 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(5) (Supp. V 2011). 
 171. See id. § 7611(a)(8)–(10). 
 172. See id. § 7612. 
 173. See id. § 7631.  Funds were also appropriated to use for malaria and tuberculosis. 
See id. §§ 7632–7633. 
 174. See id. §§ 7651–7655. 
 175. See id. § 7681. 
 176. Congress had forty-one “findings” in total. § 7601 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 177. Id. § 7601(1) (detailing the “pandemic proportions” of the spread of the disease 
worldwide). 
 178. Id. § 7601(2) (suggesting that over 65 million people have been infected, more than 
25,000,000 have died, and more than 14,000,000 children have been orphaned since the 
pandemic began). 
 179. See generally id. § 7611(a)(4) (finding abstinence from sexual activity, substance 
abuse, monogamy, faithfulness, the effective use of condoms as well as “prostitution, the sex 
trade, rape, sexual assault and sexual exploitation of women and children” to be main 
behavioral risks that should be addressed in fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic). 
 180. See id. § 7601(18) (acknowledging that “nongovernmental organizations . . . have 
proven effective in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic”); id. § 7621(b)(1) (finding that “the 
sustainment and promotion of public-private partnerships should be a priority element of the 
strategy pursued by the United States to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other global 
health crises”). 
 181. Sex trafficking is defined as “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or 
obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.” Id. § 7102(9). 
 182. The Act stated:   
Prostitution and other sexual victimization are degrading to women and children 
and it should be the policy of the United States to eradicate such practices.  The 
sex industry, the trafficking of individuals into such industry, and sexual violence 
are additional causes of and factors in the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  One 
in nine South Africans is living with AIDS, and sexual assault is rampant, at a 
victimization rate of one in three women.  Meanwhile in Cambodia, as many as 40 
percent of prostitutes are infected with HIV and the country has the highest rate of 
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of strategies continue to be employed to combat HIV/AIDS,183 Congress 
made the policy choice that sex trafficking and prostitution should be 
considered inimical to reversing the HIV/AIDS epidemic worldwide.184  
Other advocates for these populations maintain that the imposition of harsh 
criminal penalties for prostitution runs contrary to accepted best practices of 
public health.185 
b.  The Text of the Act 
Based on the findings that prostitution and sex trafficking are degrading 
to women and children,186 Congress imposed two prostitution-related 
conditions on the receipt of Leadership Act funds:  a funding provision 
(Funding Restriction) prohibiting the use of funds to promote or advocate 
the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking;187 and the 
Policy Requirement, requiring recipients to adopt a policy explicitly 
opposing both practices.188  The Funding Restriction does not preclude 
 
increase of HIV infection in all of Southeast Asia.  Victims of coercive sexual 
encounters do not get to make choices about their sexual activities. 
Id. § 7601(23). 
 183. See Proven HIV Prevention Methods, Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention 
(June 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/docs/HIVFactSheets/Methods-508.pdf 
(discussing a range of prevention techniques needed to combat HIV/AIDS, including testing, 
medication, access to condoms, at-risk prevention programs and substance abuse treatment).  
Several countries have implemented effective programs that have addressed the 
idiosyncrasies of their culture.  See GLOBAL HIV PREVENTION WORKING GRP, PROVEN HIV 
PREVENTION STRATEGIES 4 (Aug. 2006) available at http://www.kff.org/hivaids/
upload/050106_HIVPreventionStrategies.pdf (discussing the effectiveness of public 
awareness, promotion of abstinence and monogamy efforts,  free HIV testing, universal 
access to treatment and other strategies in several countries); UNAIDS, HIV PREVENTION 
NEEDS AND SUCCESSES: A TALE OF THREE COUNTRIES (2001) available at 
http://data.unaids.org/publications/IRC-pub02/jc535-hi_en.pdf (discussing contrasting 
strategies for combating HIV/AIDS in Senegal, Thailand, and Uganda). 
 184. See Joanna Busza, Having the Rug Pulled from Under Your Feet:  One Project’s 
Experience of the U.S. Policy Reversal on Sex Work, 21 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 329, 330–
31 (2006) (describing the House Committee on International Relations’ criticism of 
providing health care to sex workers). 
 185. See Edi C. M. Kinney, Appropriations for the Abolitionists:  Undermining Effects of 
the U.S. Mandatory Anti-prostitution Pledge in the Fight Against Human Trafficking and 
HIV/AIDS, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 158, 160 (2006); Press Release, ACLU, 
Global AIDS Gag Holds Critical Funding Captive to Politics (Nov. 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/global-aids-gag-holds-critical-funding-captive-politics 
[hereinafter Funding Captive to Politics]. 
 186. See 22 U.S.C. § 7601(23). 
 187. Id. § 7631(e) (“No funds made available to carry out this chapter, or any amendment 
made by this chapter, may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of 
prostitution or sex trafficking.”). 
 188. See 22 U.S.C § 7631(f).  In December 2003, Congress passed the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which has two provisions mimicking the Leadership Act’s 
Funding Restriction and Policy Requirement. First, the TVPA provides funding for anti-
trafficking activities on the condition that no funds be used to “promote, support or advocate 
the legalization or practice of prostitution.” See id. § 7110(g)(1).  The TVPA also provided 
funding on the condition that the recipient organizations state “in either a grant application, a 
grant agreement, or both, that it does not promote, support or advocate the legalization or 
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organizations from providing palliative care, post-exposure treatments, and 
“necessary pharmaceutical and commodities” such as test kits, condoms, or 
potentially microbicides.189  While the Policy Requirement prohibits 
distributing funds to any organization that does not have a policy explicitly 
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking, the restriction exempted three 
notable HIV/AIDS organizations dedicated to developing preventative HIV 
vaccines as well as “any United Nations agency.”190 
USAID, CDC and HHS have wavered when implementing the Policy 
Requirement.  Initially in 2004, USAID provided minimal guidance, but 
refrained from applying the Policy Requirement to U.S.-based NGOs 
because the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) found 
that applying the Policy Requirement to U.S.-based organizations would 
unconstitutionally restrict First Amendment free speech rights.191  The OLC 
later retracted its previous “tentative advice” and, in June 2005, USAID 
issued a directive requiring both U.S. and foreign NGOs to comply with the 
Policy Requirement.192  In the midst of litigation with both Alliance for 
Open Society International and DKT International, both HHS and USAID 
amended their guidelines in 2007 to give recipients the ability to partner 
with affiliate organizations that do comply with the requirement.193  The 
2007 guidelines attempted to clarify the separation required between 
 
practice of prostitution.” See id. § 7110(g)(2).  Unlike the Leadership Act, the TVPA 
exempted organizations that provide “assistance designed to promote the purposes of this 
Act by ameliorating the suffering of, or health risks to, victims while they are being 
trafficked or after they are out of the situation that resulted from such victims being 
trafficked.”). Id. § 7710(g)(1).  Despite the TVPA’s similarity, these provisions have not 
been challenged in any litigation to date.  For more on the definitions, causes, and concerns 
about sex trafficking and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, see Theodore R. Sangalis, 
Comment, Elusive Empowerment:  Compensating the Sex Trafficked Person Under the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403 (2011). 
 189. Id. § 7631(f). 
 190. Id. (exempting the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World 
Health Organization, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and any U.N. agency). 
 191. See USAID, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE (AAPD), 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS 
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE, LIMITATION ON THE USE OF 
FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING (Jan. 15, 2004). See 
generally Alliance IV, 651 F.3d 218, 225–27 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 
127 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the history of the policy directives). 
 192. USAID, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE (AAPD), IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA ACT 
OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION 
AND SEX TRAFFICKING 2–4 (June 9, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 POLICY DIRECTIVE]; see Alliance 
IV, 651 F.3d at 225. 
 193. See USAID, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE (AAPD), AMENDMENT 
1, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS 
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION 
TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING (July 23, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 POLICY 
DIRECTIVE]. 
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recipients and any partner or affiliate organizations by modifying the 
affiliate requirement of “objective integrity and independence.”194 
In April 2010, in the midst of continued litigation, HHS and USAID 
changed the required affirmation statement and modified the guidance on 
partnering affiliate separation.195  The 2010 guidelines provide that a 
Leadership Act recipient must affirmatively declare its opposition to 
prostitution and sex trafficking in the funding contract “because of the 
psychological and physical risks they pose for women, men, and 
children”196 and reaffirm that it “cannot engage in activities that are 
inconsistent with [its] opposition to prostitution.”197  Despite these 
clarifications and continued amendments, recipient organizations have 
continued to complain that the guidelines fail to define what activities may 
be deemed “inconsistent” with an “opposition to prostitution” under the 
Policy Requirement.198 
The Guidelines now provide that adequate separation would be 
determined with “more flexibility for funding recipients” on a case-by-case 
basis, assessed according to five, nonexclusive factors:  (1) the separation of 
personnel, management, and governance; (2) the separation of accounts and 
records; (3) the separation between the recipient and the affiliate’s facilities; 
(4) the separation of identifying signs and forms; and (5) the degree of 
public association between the affiliate’s restricted activities and the 
government.199 
c.  The Effects of the Act 
Many organizations that receive funding from the Leadership Act protest 
the implementation of the Policy Requirement, not because they support 
 
 194. The previous guidelines required legal, financial, and physical separation of 
affiliates. See Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Guidance Regarding Section 301(f) of the 
United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 41, 076, 41,076–77 (July 26, 2007); 2007 POLICY DIRECTIVE, supra note 193, at 2; 2005 
POLICY DIRECTIVE, supra note 192, at 2–4. 
 195. See Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Organizational Integrity of Entities That Are 
Implementing Programs and Activities Under the Leadership Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,760, 
18,760 (Apr. 13, 2010) (codified in part at 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2011)) [hereinafter 2010 HHS 
Guidelines]; USAID, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE (AAPD), AMENDMENT 
3, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS 
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003, AS AMENDED—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS 
AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING (Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 
Policy Directive]. 
 196. 45 C.F.R. § 89.1 (2011); 2010 Policy Directive, supra note 195, at 2. 
 197. 2010 HHS Guidelines, 75 Fed.Reg. at 18,760. 
 198. The Plaintiffs in Alliance for Open Society brought claims based on the Act’s 
definition of “promoting prostitution.” Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., v. U.S. Agency 
for Int’l Dev. (Alliance II), 570 F. Supp. 2d 533, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). For more on the Act’s 
failure to define “promoting prostitution,” see generally Sung Chang, Note & Comment, 
Prostitutes + Condoms = AIDS?:  The Leadership Act, USAID, and the HHS Guidelines’ 
Failure to Define “Promoting Prostitution,” 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 373 
(2011). 
 199. See 45 C.F.R. § 89.3(b) (2011). 
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prostitution or sex-trafficking per se, but because the Policy Requirement 
chills HIV/AIDS outreach and treatment programs.200  The Policy 
Requirement not only violates best practices policy, but alienates and 
stigmatizes the same population the NGO had sought funding to support.201 
In February 2005, a group of nonprofit organizations, including CARE, 
Save the Children, and the International Center for Research on Women, 
wrote a letter to Randall Tobias, U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance, 
protesting the Policy Requirement.202  In August 2005, a group of over 100 
nonprofits countered by signing a letter to President George H.W. Bush 
supporting the policy.203 
The Policy Requirement had immediate consequences for HIV/AIDS 
NGOs worldwide.  Brazil rejected approximately $40 million in USAID 
money because the Policy Requirement would interfere with its successful 
anti-HIV/AIDS program.204  Brazil’s AIDS commissioner Pedro Chequer 
even explained the importance of working with at-risk populations, stating, 
“‘They are our partners.  How could we ask prostitutes to take a position 
 
 200. See Brief for AIDS Action and Twenty-Five Other Public Health Organizations and 
Public Health Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8, Alliance of 
Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 254 F. App’x 843 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 
06-4035-cv), 2006 WL 5582287 at *8 [hereinafter Brief for AIDS Action] (discussing how 
the Policy Requirement “threatens to alienate the communities with which they work”); CTR. 
FOR HEALTH & GENDER EQUITY, POLICY BRIEF:  IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY RESTRICTIONS 
FOR HIV PROGRAMS AIMED AT COMMERCIAL SEX WORKERS (2008) [hereinafter H&G 
POLICY BRIEF], available at http://www.genderhealth.org/files/uploads/change/publications/
aplobrief.pdf. 
 201. See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (Alliance I), 
430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 657 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012) (finding that the stigmatizing effect of the Policy 
Requirement could push these at-risk groups underground); Erica Tracy Kagan, Morality v. 
Reality:  The Struggle to Effectively Fight HIV/AIDS and Respect Human Rights, 32 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 1201, 1224 (2007) (describing the stigmatizing effect of the Policy Requirement); 
cf. USAID, LEADING THE WAY:  USAID RESPONDS TO HIV/AIDS 1997–2000 (2001) 
[hereinafter LEADING THE WAY] (finding that working with community sex workers gives 
credibility, reduces fear, and makes the HIV/AIDS work more successful); Aziza Ahmed, 
Feminism, Power, and Sex Work in the Context of HIV/AIDS:  Consequences for Women’s 
Health, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 225, 240 (2011) (describing the need for encouraging work 
with at-risk groups like prostitutes). 
 202. David Brown, U.S. Backs Off Stipulation on AIDS Funds, WASH. POST., May 18, 
2005, at A9. 
 203. Paul Lachynsky, Over 100 Groups Urge Bush to Enforce Anti-prostitution Policy to 
Aid Sexually Exploited Women and Children, MED. NEWS TODAY (Aug. 8, 2005), 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/28834.php. 
 204. See, e.g., Esther Kaplan, Just Say Não, NATION, May 30, 2005, at 4; Matt Mofett & 
Michael M. Phillips, Brazil Refuses U.S. AIDS Funds, Rejects Conditions, WALL ST. J., May 
2, 2005, at A3 (stating that the Brazilian government turned down $40 million in anti-
HIV/AIDS funding instead of complying with the Policy Requirement). 
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against themselves?’”205  The Policy Requirement has also impacted 
programs in Thailand, India, Mali, Bangladesh, and Cambodia.206 
Additionally, the Center for Health and Gender Equality published a 
policy brief (H&G Policy Brief) in 2008 that explained how the Policy 
Requirement negatively impacted women’s health abroad.207  The H&G 
Policy Brief, using a 2006 field study, asserted that the Policy Requirement 
undermined public health best practices by undercutting the trust and 
credibility that HIV/AIDS NGOs need to foster in order to work with sex 
workers and trafficked persons, who are one of the groups at the highest 
risk for becoming infected with HIV.208  The study also found that 
“reaching sex workers [w]as the biggest challenge to their work” because 
sex workers do not disclose their vocation to those they do not know.209  
Thus, the adoption of the Policy Requirement has alienated trafficked 
persons and prostitutes and prevented them from receiving the needed aid 
that the Leadership Act meant to provide.210 
The H&G Policy Brief asserted that the HIV/AIDS work of many 
HIV/AIDS NGOs has suffered after the implementation of the Policy 
Requirement.211  The adoption of the Policy Requirement has created 
tension between programmatic success and funding, caused a chilling effect 
on organizations which results in self-censorship, curtailed effective HIV 
prevention programs, and exacerbated the stigma and isolation for already 
marginalized persons and groups.212 
 
 205. Kaplan, supra note 204, at 4; see also Moffett & Phillips, supra note 204 (quoting 
Chequer, who said the Policy Requirement was an “‘interference that harms the Brazilian 
policy regarding diversity, ethical principles and human rights’”). 
 206. See Sexworkerspresent, Taking the Pledge, BLIP (Nov. 1, 2008), http://blip.tv/
sexworkerspresent/taking-the-pledge-185356 (detailing the negative effects the Policy 
Requirement has had on prostitutes in Thailand, India, Mali, Bangladesh, Brazil, and 
Cambodia, including less access to condoms, increased poverty, and less prevention centers) 
[hereinafter Taking the Pledge]; see also Brief for AIDS Action, supra note 200, at 18–20; 
Alliance of Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 254 F. App’x 843 (2d Cir. 
2007) (No. 06-4035-cv), 2006 WL 5582287 at *18–20 (discussing how the Policy 
Requirement is already impeding NGOs’ efforts to combat HIV/AIDS). 
 207. See H&G POLICY BRIEF, supra note 200, at 2 (discussing the development of 
programs designed to educate sex workers about condom use); see also Sheetal Doshi, Sex 
Workers on the Front Line of Prevention, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 30, 2006, 
1:15am), http://www.icij.org/projects/divine-intervention/sex-workers-front-line-prevention 
(discussing an effective strategy implemented by one anti-AIDS organization in India).  The 
H&G Policy Brief also challenged the constitutionality of the Policy Requirement in passing. 
H&G POLICY BRIEF, supra note 200, at 2. 
 208. H&G POLICY BRIEF, supra note 200, at 2; Brief for AIDS Action, supra note 200, at 
9, 14 (detailing how the Policy Requirement contradicts “best practice[s]” for HIV/AIDS 
prevention and care). 
 209. H&G POLICY BRIEF, supra note 200, at 3. 
 210. Id.  The H&G Policy Brief even detailed one organization whose program had been 
recognized as a U.N. AIDS “best practice,” but had suffered a serious decline after 
conforming to the Policy Requirement mandated by the Leadership Act. Id. at 3. 
 211. Id. at 4 (describing the sharp declines in HIV/AIDS education and the monthly 
condom distribution rate). 
 212. Id. at 2–6; Taking the Pledge, supra note 206 (interviewing several sex workers 
about the negative impacts of the Policy Requirement on their lives). 
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The H&G Policy Brief’s suspicions have since been confirmed by other 
sources.213  It has even been suggested that the negative fallout of the 
United States’ expanded so-called global gag order against HIV/AIDS work 
with high-risk populations is tantamount to “public health malpractice.”214  
The Policy Requirement’s effects on anti–human trafficking initiatives are 
less well documented, but one commentator suggests they are equally as 
detrimental.215 
Activism against the Policy Requirement has not abated. In July 2012, 
HIV/AIDS activists protested the Policy Requirement both domestically 
and abroad.216  The United Nation’s Development Program even published 
a report in September 2012 denouncing the Policy Requirement and 
recommending its repeal.217 
II.  MUST THE PAID PIPER PLAY THE TUNE?:  CONFLICT AMONG COURTS 
OVER WHETHER THE LEADERSHIP ACT’S POLICY REQUIREMENT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGES ON RECIPIENT NGOS’ FREE SPEECH 
Part II of this Note details the conflict between the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals over the Leadership Act’s Policy Requirement.  Courts differ on 
whether the Policy Requirement places an unconstitutional condition on 
federal funding to be distributed to domestic NGOs combating the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, thereby impermissibly discriminating on the basis of 
viewpoint.  Additionally, courts are split on whether the Policy 
Requirement compels unwilling NGOs to convey a government message.  
In the following sections, this Note examines the three approaches to these 
issues.  Part II.A discusses the 2007 decision of the D.C. Circuit, DKT 
International v. U.S. Agency for International Development,218 which 
 
 213. See Funding Captive to Politics, supra note 185 (discussing the alliance of many 
signatory organizations who filed an amicus brief in the Alliance for Open Society 
litigation); Susan A. Cohen, Ominous Convergence:  Sex Trafficking, Prostitution and 
International Family Planning, 8 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 12–13 (2005) 
(discussing the counterproductive interventions of antiabortion and anti-prostitution 
campaigns on public health). 
 214. See Kinney, supra note 185, at 164 (discussing the implications of the Policy 
Requirement on public health); Funding Captive to Politics, supra note 185; see also 
Mehilka Hoodbhoy et al., Exporting Despair:  The Human Rights Implications of U.S. 
Restrictions on Foreign Health Care Funding in Kenya, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2005) 
(suggesting that current U.S. funding policies may violate international human rights 
obligations such as the right to health). 
 215. Kinney, supra note 185, at 181–90. 
 216. Claire Provost, Anti-prostitution Pledge in US Aids Funding “Damaging” HIV 
Response, GUARDIAN (July 24, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/2012/jul/24/prostitution-us-aids-funding-sex?CMP=email (describing protests 
in Washington, D.C., and Kolkata, India). 
 217. U.N. DEVELOPMENT POLICY, HIV/AIDS GROUP, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON HIV AND 
THE LAW:  RISKS, RIGHTS AND HEALTH ¶ 3.2.8, 43 (2012) (“Repeal punitive conditions in 
official development assistance—such as the United States government’s PEPFAR anti-
prostitution pledge and its current anti-trafficking regulations—that inhibit sex workers’ 
access to HIV services or their ability to form organisations in their own interests.”). 
 218. 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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upheld the policy requirement.  Part II.B discusses the majority decision in 
Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for 
International Development219 in the Second Circuit, which struck down the 
Policy Requirement as compelled speech and viewpoint discriminatory.  
Part II.C discusses Judge Straub’s dissent in the Second Circuit, which 
found that the Policy Requirement did not impermissibly burden the 
recipients’ free speech rights. 
A.  DKT International and the D.C. Circuit 
DKT International is an organization that provides family planning and 
AIDS prevention programming in eighteen different countries around the 
world.220  In June 2005, Family Health International (FHI), a family 
planning NGO in Vietnam, attempted to contract DKT to operate as a 
subgrantee to run a USAID-funded program and provided DKT with an 
agreement, which included the certification that DKT had a policy 
“explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking” in conformity with the 
Leadership Act Policy Requirement.221  DKT refused to comply with the 
Policy Requirement.222  FHI cancelled the grant and informed DKT that 
funding had been discontinued.223  Unlike other HIV/AIDS NGOs, DKT 
did not depend on government funding to operate, with only 16 percent of 
its total budget coming from USAID grants.224  DKT then filed a complaint 
for an injunction on the use of the Policy Requirement.225 
This section discusses the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in DKT, which held that 
the Policy Requirement is a permissible funding condition because it 
neither imposes a penalty on protected First Amendment rights nor 
discriminates in a way aimed at the suppression of ideas.226  First, this 
section outlines the court’s argument that the Policy Requirement does not 
suppress an unpopular idea.  Then, it details the court’s determination that 
this Policy Requirement does not impermissibly discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint and allows for alternate routes of expression.  Finally, this 
section explains the court’s determination that the government had not 
created a forum for public speech nor encouraged private speech.  As such, 
the Policy Requirement was a permissible condition to prevent the 
government’s message from being distorted. 
 
 219. 651 F.3d 218, 223–24 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 
2012), petition for cert. filed, 2012 WL 2586932 (U.S. July 2, 2012) (No. 12-10). 
 220. DKT INTERNATIONAL, http://dktinternational.org/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012); see 
DKT, 477 F.3d at 760. 
 221. DKT, 477 F.3d at 760. 
 222. Id. at 761. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 760. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 764. 
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1.  The Policy Requirement Does Not Attempt to Suppress 
an Unpopular Idea 
The D.C. Circuit upheld the Policy Requirement as a constitutional 
condition on federal funds, finding that “[t]he Act does not compel DKT to 
advocate the government’s position on prostitution and sex trafficking; it 
requires only that if DKT wishes to receive funds it must communicate the 
message the government chooses to fund.”227  Under the government 
speech doctrine, the court found that the government can discriminate on 
the basis of viewpoint when communicating a government message to make 
sure that the message is properly communicated.228  While the choice to 
fund certain activities at the exclusion of others will necessarily 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, that choice is problematic only when 
made to suppress a dangerous idea.229 
The D.C. Circuit recognized that the Policy Requirement was not 
intended to suppress the expression of NGOs desiring to remain silent or 
oppose the government’s message against prostitution and sex 
trafficking.230  Instead, the court found that the Policy Requirement nobly 
aimed to eradicate prostitution and reduce the behavioral risks that cause 
the spread of the HIV epidemic.231 
2.  Alternative Routes of Expression Remain Available 
The court also found that the Policy Requirement did nothing to prevent 
an NGO from speaking its own message either by rejecting the funding or 
alternatively creating a subsidiary or affiliate organization that agrees to the 
policy opposing prostitution.232  Like in Rust, where the clinic could 
advocate abortion if it conducted that activity “through programs that are 
separate and independent from the project that receives Title X funds,”233 a 
subsidiary could adopt the Policy Requirement while the parent 
organization remains independent according to the USAID and HHS 
guidelines.234 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. See supra notes 127–29, 143 and accompanying text. 
 229. See DKT, 477 F.3d at 761 (“When it communicates its message . . . the government 
can—and often must—discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.” (citing Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))).  The Court makes several 
comparisons to illustrate this point. Id. (finding that if the government funds Nancy Reagan’s 
“Just Say No” anti-drug campaign, it is not constitutionally required to simultaneously 
sponsor a “Just Say Yes” pro-drug campaign).  Other courts have found similar illustrations 
useful. See, e.g., DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 289 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (suggesting that a Surgeon General’s activities against smoking does not 
require a simultaneous program supporting smoking activities). 
 230. DKT, 477 F.3d at 764 (finding that the Policy Requirement was only aimed at trying 
to encourage a government message, not suppressing speech). 
 231. Id. at 761 (detailing the objective of the Leadership Act to “eradicate HIV/AIDS”). 
 232. Id. at 763. 
 233. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1990). 
 234. DKT, 477 F.3d at 763. 
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The D.C. Circuit also found that the Policy Requirement did not restrict 
any recipient’s First Amendment speech outside the scope of the recipient’s 
participation in the government program.235  While the DKT court 
acknowledged that, unlike Rust, the Leadership Act placed restrictions on 
grantees, as opposed to just projects, it held that DKT could remain neutral 
by setting up a subsidiary or affiliate organization.236  The Policy 
Requirement’s effect on the entire organization rather than the funded 
project does not prevent the recipient NGO from remaining neutral.237  
Several other courts have echoed the DKT court’s finding that conditional 
subsidies with independent affiliate requirements cure any constitutional 
difficulty by allowing the recipients to confine the speech condition to the 
federally funded program.238 
3.  The Government Had Not Created a Forum for Speech 
or Encouraged Private Speech 
As elucidated above, a government condition becomes unconstitutional 
not only when it impermissibly discriminates by viewpoint but also when it 
operates as a coercive penalty.239  A government condition becomes 
coercive if it forces the recipient to convey a message with which it would 
not otherwise agree.240  The D.C. Circuit adopted a narrow reading of Rust 
and Rosenberger, finding that the Policy Requirement had not created a 
quasi-public forum for private speakers to voice their viewpoint.241  The 
interpretation rested on the distinction between government subsidy 
programs that provide funds to encourage private speech in a public forum 
and those that “use private speakers to transmit specific information 
pertaining to its own program.”242  Citing Rosenberger, Rust, and DKT 
Memorial International v. U.S. Agency for International Development,243 
the court found that the government may constitutionally communicate a 
particular viewpoint through agents and require that those agents not 
 
 235. Id. at 764. 
 236. Id. at 763. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Planned Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan., Inc. v. Dempsey, 167 F.3d 458, 
463–64 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding a Missouri statute “requir[ing] abortion services to be 
provided through independent affiliates”); Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. 
Corp., 145 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding regulations “requir[ing] that if a 
recipient wishes to engage in prohibited activities, it must establish an organization separate 
from the recipient in order to ensure that federal funds are not spent on prohibited 
activities”).  
 239. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 240. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 241. DKT, 477 F.3d at 762 (“Here too the government has not created ‘a program to 
encourage private speech’ . . . [i]n this case, as in Rust, ‘the government’s own message is 
being delivered.’” (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1984), 
and Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001))). 
 242. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001). 
 243. DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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convey contrary messages.244  While the law at issue in Rust only 
demanded that programs and not the entire organization convey a message, 
the D.C. Circuit suggested that DKT could avoid adopting an organization-
wide policy and still receive funding by setting up a separate subsidiary 
organization with an antiprostitution policy that could receive and spend the 
Agency’s funds.245 
The D.C. Circuit also found that the Policy Requirement was not meant 
to encourage private speech.246  The government can make sure that its 
agents do not “convey contrary messages,” and that its “message is 
conveyed in an efficient and effective fashion.”247  Because the 
government’s program would be undermined if recipients hired to 
implement the program could advance alternative viewpoints at the same 
time, the court upheld the Policy Requirement.248 
The D.C. Circuit also added that when the government speaks on matters 
with foreign policy implications, the government has a heightened incentive 
to protect its viewpoint.249  While admitting that the government’s main 
objective in the Leadership Act was to “eradicate HIV/AIDS,” the D.C. 
Circuit also found that government speech was a primary means of 
achieving that objective.250  Plaintiffs never contested the legitimate 
government interest in eradicating HIV/AIDS or ending prostitution and sex 
trafficking.251  The court found that both objectives are equally integral to 
Congressional intent.252  The legitimacy of the government interest was not 
weakened by the exemptions to the Policy Requirement provided to select 
organizations.253  Fundamentally, “[s]pending money to convince people at 
 
 244. DKT, 477 F.3d at 761 (“The government may speak through . . . government officers 
and employees . . . .  Or it may hire private agents to speak for it. . . .  When it communicates 
its message, either through public officials or private entities, the government can—and 
often must—discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.” (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
196 (1990), Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995), & 
DKT Mem’l, 887 F.2d at 289)). 
 245. Id. at 763. 
 246. Id. at 762. 
 247. Id. (finding that the government can “use criteria to ensure” that its agents do “not 
convey contrary messages” and that its “message is conveyed in an efficient and effective 
fashion”); cf. DKT Mem’l, 887 F.2d at 290–91 (holding that the government has long held 
the ability to maintain its own message). 
 248. See DKT, 477 F.3d at 762–63. 
 249. Id. at 762 (finding that “where the government is speaking on matters with foreign 
policy implications, as it is here,” the government has a more legitimate interest in ensuring 
that its speech is “‘neither garbled nor distorted’” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))); DKT Mem’l, 887 F.2d at 289–91 (“To hold that 
the United States government cannot make viewpoint-based choices in foreign affairs would 
not only depart from settled precedent, but would work much mischief.”).  
 250. See DKT, 477 F.3d at 761 (finding that the Leadership Act necessitated the “United 
States to speak out against legalizing prostitution in other countries” and “not merely to ship 
condoms and medicine to regions where the disease is rampant”). 
 251. See id. at 761 (describing both objectives of the Leadership Act). 
 252. Id. 
 253. See id. at 763 n.5 (“[T]he Act’s underinclusiveness does not violate the First 
Amendment. . . .  Because viewpoint discrimination raises no First Amendment concerns 
when the government is speaking, the underinclusiveness of the certification requirement is 
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risk of HIV/AIDS to change their behavior is necessarily a message.”254 
Because the condition did not compel the recipient “to advocate the 
government’s position on prostitution and sex trafficking,” the DKT court 
concluded that the Policy Requirement need not be subjected to any 
heightened scrutiny255 and did not violate the First Amendment.256 
B.  Alliance for Open Society and the Second Circuit 
Alliance for Open Society Institute (AOSI) and Pathfinder are both 
independent U.S.-based NGOs actively engaged in the worldwide effort to 
combat HIV and AIDS.257  Both organizations work closely with 
populations that have a high-risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, including drug 
users, victims of sex trafficking, and prostitutes.258  Both NGOs, like DKT 
International, engage with these at-risk groups to improve accessibility and 
create other gateways to prevention within the general population.259  Both 
NGOs receive financial assistance from the U.S. government through the 
USAID,260 as well as from private sources.261 
In 2005, USAID told AOSI that their guidelines did not comply with the 
Policy Requirement.262  AOSI and the Open Society Institute quickly filed 
suit, challenging the provision, and Pathfinder quickly joined.263  In 2006, 
the district judge issued a preliminary injunction preventing the agencies 
from enforcing the Policy Requirement against the NGOs because the 
condition impermissibly banned protected speech.264  After the case was 
remanded when HHS and USAID published new guidelines,265 the district 
 
immaterial.” (citing Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 250–51 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., 
concurring))). 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. at 761–63 (applying a more deferential lower standard of scrutiny, though not 
explicitly stated, based on the overinclusivity and underinclusivity of the Policy 
Requirement). 
 256. Id. at 764. 
 257. See Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 657 F.3d 218 (2d 
Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 232. 
 260. Pathfinder receives additional funds from other agencies such as the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Center for Disease Control 
(CDC). See id. at 230–31. 
 261. Alliance for Open Society is closely affiliated with, though independent of, the Open 
Society Institute established and financed by George Soros, which supports a network of 
more than thirty foundations that operate worldwide. Id. at 230.  Alliance for Open Society 
has received financial support from USAID but has also received a private grant from the 
Open Society Institute of nearly $2.2 million. Id.  Pathfinder has similar utilized grants from 
private sources to fund many of its programs related to family planning and reproductive 
health services. Id. 
 262. Id. at 237. 
 263. Id. at 237–38. 
 264. Id. at 276. 
 265. Guidance Regarding Section 301(f) of the United States Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, 45 C.F.R. pt. 89 (2011); 2007 POLICY 
DIRECTIVE, supra note 193, at 3. 
 1132 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
court stood by its first decision, striking down the Policy Requirement a 
second time,266 and the Second Circuit ultimately affirmed.267 
This section discusses the Second Circuit’s majority decision in Alliance 
for Open Society,268 along with the Southern District of New York and D.C. 
District Courts,269 which struck down the Leadership Act’s Policy 
Requirement as an unconstitutional condition on federal funds.270  This 
section outlines the standard that Second Circuit adopts for evaluating 
whether a conditional subsidy unconstitutional infringes on First 
Amendment free speech rights.  It then discusses the court’s application of 
that standard, finding that the Policy Requirement impermissibly 
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint and compels speech. 
1.  The Policy Requirement Impermissibly Compels Recipients 
to Espouse the Government’s Position 
As seen in Part I.A.1, compelled speech “cannot be squared with the First 
Amendment.”271  Because the Policy Requirement forces any recipient to 
declare its opposition to prostitution and sex-trafficking, the Second Circuit 
compared the Policy Requirement to other compelled speech cases and 
found that “silence, or neutrality, is not an option” for any recipient of 
Leadership Act funds.272  Conceding that Wooley, Speiser, and Barnette did 
not control, the court found those holdings instructive when analyzing the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which had never dealt with an 
affirmative speech requirement before.273  Because the First Amendment 
frowns on affirmative-speech requirements, and because the Policy 
Requirement pushed beyond the Regan and Rust progeny, the court found 
the Policy Requirement warranted heightened scrutiny.274 
The court even found that the Policy Requirement ignored dicta from 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR), where the 
Supreme Court upheld the Solomon Amendment’s requirement that 
 
 266. Alliance II, 570 F. Supp. 2d 533, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 
2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 267. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d 218, 223–24 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 
127 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012).  
 268. Id. 
 269. Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), 
reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. 
July 2, 2012); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (DKT I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 5 
(D.D.C. 2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 270. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 223–24; DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 12–14; Alliance I, 
430 F. Supp. 2d at 274–76. 
 271. Alliance IV, 651 F. 3d at 234. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 234–35 n.3 (“[A]lthough Regan and its progeny unquestionably provide the 
framework for our analysis, they do not capture the Policy Requirement as neatly . . . .”). 
The Court took away the principle that “the First Amendment does not look fondly on 
attempts by the government to affirmatively require speech.” Id.; see also supra note 46 and 
accompanying text. 
 274. Id. at 234–35. 
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universities permit military recruiters on campus as a condition of receiving 
federal funding.275  The FAIR Court signaled that affirmative government-
preferred speech raises “serious First Amendment concerns” by noting that 
“[t]here is nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge 
or motto that the school must endorse.”276  Concluding that the result of 
FAIR would have been different if a forced pledge or motto had been 
required, the Second Circuit found the Policy Requirement to be exactly the 
type of government-mandated pledge that FAIR warned about.277  Thus, the 
court found that the Policy Requirement unconstitutionally compelled the 
recipients to speak the government’s message and exceeded the limits of 
permissible funding conditions.278 
2.  The Policy Requirement Impermissibly Discriminates on 
the Basis of Viewpoint 
The Second Circuit also found that the Policy Requirement constituted 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination by requiring the recipients to 
endorse the government’s point of view.279  While viewpoint-based 
restrictions are presumed unconstitutional under the First Amendment,280 
conditional viewpoint-based funding restrictions were found “not 
necessarily unconstitutional” under Rust.281  The court added that such 
restrictions do merit heightened scrutiny because they are “constitutionally 
troublesome.”282  Because it combined both affirmative and viewpoint-
based speech requirements, the Policy Requirement ultimately failed 
heightened scrutiny.283 
3.  The Policy Requirement Fails Heightened Scrutiny 
Having concluded that the Policy Requirement is an affirmative-speech 
viewpoint-based funding requirement, the Second Circuit applied an 
 
 275. Id. (citing FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 61–62 (2006)). 
 276. Id. at 234, 235 (citing FAIR, 547 U.S. at 61–62). 
 277. Id. at 234–35. 
 278. Id. at 234 (finding that the Policy Requirement “falls well beyond what the Supreme 
Court and this Court have upheld as permissible funding conditions”). 
 279. Id. at 235. 
 280. See, e.g., supra notes 46–48; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991). 
 281. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 235. 
 282. See id. (finding the dicta by all four dissenting Justices in FCC v. League of Women 
Voters to be persuasive that viewpoint-based restrictions are constitutionally problematic); 
see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 407–08 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that the prohibition’s viewpoint neutral stance was the most 
significant and determinative aspect of the restriction).  The Second Circuit found added 
confirmation for this conclusion in the Legal Services Corporations line of cases. Alliance 
IV, 651 F.3d at 235–36; see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540–42 
(2001). 
 283. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 236 (finding that the “bold combination . . . of a speech-
targeted restriction that is both affirmative and quintessentially viewpoint-based” warranted 
heightened scrutiny). 
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unspecified heightened scrutiny test.284  The court first questioned whether 
the Leadership Act’s purpose is to convey the particular antiprostitution 
message285 and distinguished between programs in which conveying a 
government message is the stated purpose of the program and those 
programs where the message is only secondary.286  Because the Leadership 
Act’s primary purpose was to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, 
not to campaign against prostitution,287 the court found that the government 
could not retroactively recast the Leadership Act’s purpose as one of 
conveying a message against prostitution simply because that would 
conveniently give it the ability to compel recipients to affirmatively espouse 
its point of view.288  Indeed, the court found that the Leadership Act’s 
exemption for some organizations severely undermines the conclusion that 
conveying a government message is really so central to the Leadership 
Act’s purpose.289 
Additionally, because the Policy Requirement is a matter of international 
debate and public concern, greater First Amendment protection is 
warranted.290  Because it not only bans certain pro-prostitution speech,291 
but also precludes silence or neutrality on a “contested public issue,” the 
Policy Requirement unfairly skews international debate.292  In fact, the 
Policy Requirement runs counter to the best practices for HIV/AIDS 
 
 284. See id. at 234, 239 (applying a heightened scrutiny standard and discussing 
alternative routes of expression). 
 285. See id. at 237 (describing the centrality of the antiprostitution message to the 
Leadership Act program). 
 286. Id. (differentiating between government programs whose purpose is to convey a 
particular message and those in which the message is secondary); cf. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 
547 (“Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in 
every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise.”). 
 287. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 237–38 (finding that the Leadership Act’s purpose is to fight 
HIV/AIDS, not to facilitate an “anti-prostitution messaging campaign”). 
 288. Id. at 238 (“If the government-speech principle allowed Congress to compel funding 
recipients to affirmatively espouse its viewpoint on every subsidiary issue subsumed within a 
federal spending program, the exception would swallow the rule.”). 
 289. See 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006); Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 238 (“In short, the 
Agencies’ suggestion that requiring Plaintiffs to adopt an anti-prostitution policy statement is 
integral to the Leadership Act program is undermined by the fact that the government has 
chosen to fund high-profile, global organizations that remain free to express—and indeed 
openly express—a contrary policy, or no policy at all.”). 
 290. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 236; see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 
913 (1982) (“[E]xpression on public issues ‘has always rested on the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 
(1980))). 
 291. The court never actually discusses what sorts of speech are prohibited as 
“inconsistent with [an] opposition to the practice[] of prostitution.” 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2011).  
The majority did not reach the argument that the Policy Requirement was unconstitutionally 
vague because they found the Policy Requirement to be an unconstitutional condition, 
though it acknowledged that both parties did not seem to have a good “grasp on what it 
means to engage in expression that is ‘inconsistent’ with an opposition to prostitution.” 
Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 239–40 n.8. 
 292. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 236. 
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prevention.293  Thus, the Policy Requirement might even cause more harm 
than good.294  The court overlooked the need for a unified government 
message in foreign affairs because the Policy Requirement principally 
impacted domestic U.S.-based NGOs’ speech.295 
At the trial court level, both district courts also found that the Policy 
Requirement was not narrowly tailored to the government objective of 
preventing the expression of a contrary message.296  Instead of limiting only 
the speech used with federal funds, the Policy Requirement limits the 
speech used with both private and public funds by requiring a policy to be 
adopted by the entire organization.297 
The court found that giving recipient NGOs the ability to engage in 
privately funded silence or neutrality provided an inadequate alternative.298  
While an affiliate provides the recipient an outlet to express a pro-
prostitution message, the affirmative obligation to speak the government’s 
message prevents the recipient from abstaining from the debate 
altogether.299  Less restrictive measures exist:  a recipient could abide by 
the Policy Requirement in the funded-program while being free to speak in 
other nonfederally funded programs.300 
The Alliance for Open Society district court even suggested that 
disclaimers could be used to clarify that particular projects and activities are 
privately funded and not support by the government funds, a method far 
less restrictive than preventing recipient NGOs from engaging in “any 
speech conveying a different viewpoint than the one advanced by the 
Act.”301  Consequently, the Policy Requirement was overbroad by 
restricting the NGO’s ability to use its own private funding, as opposed to 
just its own government funds.302  Because the Policy Requirement 
compels grantees to espouse the government’s position on a controversial 
issue, the Second Circuit concluded that the Policy Requirement was an 
unconstitutional condition placed on the receipt of federal funds.303  One 
 
 293. See id. (describing the World Health Organization and the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS’s recognition that  advocating for the reduction of penalties for 
prostitution in order to stimulate outreach efforts is considered a best practice). 
 294. Id. (detailing the Policy Requirement’s negative foreign policy implications). 
 295. Id. at 239 (holding that the domestic impact of the Policy Requirement makes it 
“more of a domestic than a foreign concern”). 
 296. See DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 14 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (addressing the overinclusivity of the Policy Requirement); Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d 
222, 268–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 
F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012) (addressing the 
Policy Requirement’s lack of narrow tailoring). 
 297. See Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (finding that affirmative or compelled speech 
requirements do not address “adequate alternative channels”). 
 298. DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 13. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 14. 
 301. Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 270. 
 302. DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 15–16. 
 303. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d 218, 239 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127, 
petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012). 
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other court has noted the unconstitutionality of the Policy Requirement.304  
One commentator also agrees with the Second Circuit’s holding, though 
suggesting that ultimately Congress should amend the statute to survive 
constitutional scrutiny.305 
C.  Judge Straub’s Dissent in Alliance for Open Society 
Judge Straub wrote a spirited and elaborate dissent where he detailed his 
version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrinal analysis.  When he 
applied his test, he found that the Policy Requirement neither discriminated 
on the basis of viewpoint nor compelled speech nor acted as a coercive 
penalty.  He concluded that the Policy Requirement did not merit 
heightened scrutiny and, consequently, would have upheld its 
constitutionality.  This section discusses Judge Straub’s dissent, focusing on 
the standard he elaborated and how he applied that standard to reach its 
result. 
1.  A New Framework of Analysis for Unconstitutional Conditions 
Judge Straub chided the majority for thinking that affirmative funding 
conditions raise more “serious First Amendment concerns” than negative 
funding conditions.306  Consequently he found the majority’s reliance on 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,307 Speiser v. 
Randall,308 and Wooley v. Maynard309 to be unfounded.310  The majority 
characterized those cases, traditionally described to be compelled speech 
cases,311 as unconstitutional conditions cases where the government 
threatened the denial of an already-existing benefit (“going to school” or 
“using the roads”), over which the government had monopolistic control as 
a means of coercing the recipients to give up First Amendment rights.312  
Judge Straub saw the majority as attempting to “creatively recast” those 
 
 304. See Hill v. Kemp, 645 F. Supp. 2d. 992, 1005 (N.D. Okla. 2009) (finding that 
because the Leadership compelled an NGO to adopt a policy that would affect its non-
federal funds and because no adequate alternative method allowed the organization to 
express a contradictory viewpoint, “the requirement to enact a policy opposing the 
legalization of prostitution constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination”). 
 305. See Garima Malhotra, Comment, Good Intentions, Bad Consequences:  How 
Congress’s Efforts to Eradicate HIV/AIDS Stifle the Speech of Humanitarian Organizations, 
61 CATH. U. L. REV. 839, 860–65 (2012) (finding the Policy Requirement unworkable and 
unconstitutional and suggesting Congress should amend the statute to permit organizations 
to regulate the process for allocating their own funds while retaining the prohibition on 
funding activities related to legalizing prostitution). 
 306. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 255 (Straub, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 234 (majority 
opinion)). 
 307. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 308. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 309. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 310. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 256. 
 311. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (describing 
Barnette as a case of “outright compulsion of speech”). 
 312. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 256. 
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cases as conditional subsidies and distinguished them as cases that 
conditioned benefits on something that the recipient could not realistically 
deny:  public education or public road use.313  Additionally, the compelled 
speech requirements were completely unrelated to the government benefit 
at issue.314  Instead, Alliance for Open Society neither relies on Leadership 
Act funds for “continued survival”315 nor relies on the government as its 
only source of funding.316  Because any recipient could realistically reject 
these funds, Judge Straub found that the government did not “compel 
anyone to speak the government’s favored viewpoint.”317  A number of 
Second Circuit judges dissented from the denial of a rehearing en banc with 
the same criticism.318  These dissents suggest that an affirmative-negative 
speech restriction is irrelevant to the unconstitutional conditions analysis.319 
Similarly, Straub categorically objected to the majority’s reliance on 
dicta from FAIR.320  Straub found that the dicta in FAIR only stated the 
conclusion that there was no underlying First Amendment violation.321  
Consequently, the Policy Requirement was not found to be coercive 
because “[t]here is a basic difference between the denial of government 
funding and a direct compulsion to speak.”322 
After discarding that line of cases, Judge Straub presented two ways in 
which a conditional subsidy could be unconstitutional:  (1) the condition 
operates as a “coercive penalty on the exercise of First Amendment rights”; 
or (2) the condition operates to suppress a certain viewpoint.323  Based on 
Regan, Straub observed that the court found that a conditional government 
subsidy could be considered a coercive penalty on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights if (1) the condition restricted the recipient’s speech 
outside of the scope of the recipient’s participation in the government 
 
 313. See id. at 255–56; DKT Int’l, Inc., v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 762 
n.2 (2007) (“Offering to fund organizations who agree with the government’s viewpoint and 
will promote the government’s program is far removed from [Wooley and Barnette] in which 
the government coerced its citizens into promoting its message on pain of losing their public 
education . . . or access to public roads.”). 
 314. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 257. 
 315. See id. 
 316. While the exact percentage of Alliance for Open Society’s and Pathfinder’s total 
funds derived from Agency grants is unclear, both certainly “receive funding from sources 
other than the Agencies.” Id. at 224 (majority opinion). 
 317. See id. at 254 (Straub, J., dissenting). 
 318. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 678 F.3d 127 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (noting that “the policy requirement does not actually 
“mandate,” “compel,” or “require” the plaintiffs to say anything at all” (citing Alliance IV, 
651 F.3d at 223, 228, 230 (majority opinion))). 
 319. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 256–57 (Straub, J., dissenting). 
 320. Id. at 257–58; see FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)(“There is nothing in this case 
approaching a Government-mandated pledge or motto that the school must endorse.”). 
 321. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 258 (finding that the Supreme Court in FAIR has found 
that “a necessary but not sufficient element of an unconstitutional funding condition was 
absent—there would be no underlying First Amendment violation if the condition was 
applied directly”). 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 246.  
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program; or (2) the condition denied government benefits to which the 
recipient would otherwise be entitled and that the government program at 
issue did not provide.324  Either way, the denial of the government benefit 
would infringe on the recipient’s freedom of speech.325 
Additionally, Straub found that a funding condition only suppresses 
certain viewpoints when the condition (1) aims to suppress dangerous ideas; 
or (2) when the government creates a public forum designed to facilitate 
private speech.326  He saw the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a two-
step inquiry.  First, the program must be deemed to create a public forum 
that encourages a diversity of viewpoints.327  If the program does not create 
a public forum, but instead uses private speakers to convey a government 
message, then the government is allowed to ensure that its message is 
neither “garbled or distorted”328 by restricting the viewpoints that can be 
expressed by that private speaker, so long as it does not interfere with any 
traditional relationships.329  If the program does establish a public forum, 
then the government cannot violate its neutrality mandate without being 
assessed under strict scrutiny and being presumed unconstitutional.330 
2.  Applying the Test:  The Policy Requirement Does Not Impermissibly 
Infringe on an NGO’s Free Speech 
When Judge Straub applied his test, he found that the Leadership Act’s 
Policy Requirement neither serves as a coercive penalty nor suppresses a 
dangerous idea.  This section details his finding that the Policy Requirement 
does not act as a penalty and explains his conclusion that the Policy 
Requirement does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. 
a.  The Policy Requirement Does Not Act As a Coercive Penalty 
First, Judge Straub concurred with the DKT International court that the 
Policy Requirement did not restrict any recipient’s speech outside of the 
scope of the program.331  He found that the organizational integrity 
guidelines allowing for affiliate structures alleviate any concerns of 
restricting speech outside of the program.332  An affiliate organization 
 
 324. See id. at 246–48 (“[T]here is no coercive force behind a funding condition that is 
truly cabined to the federal subsidy program to which it is attached.”). 
 325. See FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006). 
 326. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 261. 
 327. See supra notes 59–71 and accompanying text. 
 328. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
 329. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1990); supra Part I.A.1.a. 
 330. See supra notes 67–71, 128, 143, 148–149 and accompanying notes. 
 331. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 259 (suggesting that any recipient is free to continue “to 
remain silent or to espouse a pro-prostitution message with non-Leadership Act funds” by 
creating an “affiliate organization to receive Leadership Act funds and comply with the 
Leadership Act’s Policy Requirement”). 
 332. Id. at 262 (suggesting that the “organizational integrity guidelines” leave NGOs in 
the same condition as previous to the regulation, with the ability to remain silent or speak a 
pro-prostitution message). 
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provides an adequate alternate route for expression and the ability to create 
an affiliate organization provides the ability to engage in silence.333  
Consequently, the Policy Requirement is not an impermissible restriction 
preventing any adequate alternative “outlets” for expression; it is simply a 
condition to accept or deny.334 
Second, Judge Straub finds that the condition does not deny government 
benefits to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled and that the 
government program at issue did not provide.335  Thus, failing to comply 
with the Policy Requirement does not threaten any independent existing 
benefits.336 
b.  The Policy Requirement Does Not Suppress Any Viewpoint 
Applying his test, Judge Straub finds that the Policy Requirement is 
neither aimed at the dangerous suppression of ideas or in a government-
created public forum designed to facilitate private speech.  Similar to the 
D.C. Circuit, Judge Straub recognized that the Policy Requirement was not 
intended to suppress the expression of NGOs desiring to remain silent or to 
oppose the government’s message against prostitution and sex 
trafficking.337  In fact, in neither case did the plaintiff argue that Congress 
intended to do so.338  Judge Straub even points out that the effect of the law 
would not be to suppress pro-prostitution views because public discourse 
would hardly be altered by obligating a specific range of NGOs to espouse 
the antiprostitution position.339  The Policy Requirement even supported the 
reasonable goal of reducing a cause of the spread of HIV.340 
Distinguishing Rosenberger, Judge Straub found that the Policy 
Requirement had not meant to encourage private speech by NGOs.341 
Consequently, the government was allowed to take certain measures to 
ensure that its message was not weakened or diluted.342  Public forum 
 
 333. Id. 
 334. See id. at 259. 
 335. Id. at 258 (“The only consequence if Plaintiffs do not subscribe to the Leadership 
Act’s Policy Requirement is that they will not receive Leadership Act funds.”). 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 261 (finding that the purpose of the Policy Requirement was not to suppress 
pro-prostitution views or even neutrality). 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. (finding that Congress could not have intended to suppress public support for 
prostitution with a conditional funding requirement to a narrow range of groups that wished 
to combat HIV/AIDS). 
 340. Id. at 261–62 (“[T]he purpose and effects of the Policy Requirement are a far cry 
from those cases where the government condition was clearly aimed at the suppression or 
compulsion of speech qua speech.”). 
 341. Id. at 262 (finding that the purpose of the Leadership Act was not to fund a variety of 
NGOs interested in espousing their viewpoint on prostitution and sex-trafficking but sought 
“to advance an anti-prostitution, anti–sex trafficking approach to combating HIV/AIDS” 
(citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601(23), 7611(a)(12) (2006))). 
 342. Id. at 263 (distinguishing the Velazquez cases because the government’s message 
and strategy of combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic would be weakened and diluted if its 
partners were allowed to speak in ways contrary to that message). 
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principles were consequently inapplicable to the Policy Requirement 
because “Congress did not authorize Leadership Act funds ‘in order to 
create a public forum for [Plaintiffs] to express themselves.’”343 
Foreign policy issues also weighed in favor of allowing the government 
to make sure its message is not garbled.  Judge Straub suggested that 
because these polices are controversial and far-reaching, courts should defer 
to Congress.344 
Finally, Judge Straub categorically rejected the majority’s interpretation 
that the purpose of the Leadership Act must be examined at the broadest 
level of generality to see whether the viewpoint discrimination is a primary 
or secondary component to the substantive goals of the program.345  The 
viewpoint discrimination need not be a “central” component in order for it 
to be permissible.  Neither Rust nor Rosenberger nor Velazquez considered 
the priority or weight of the potential purposes of the programs and Judge 
Straub argued that the majority should not have considered them either.346 
Like the DKT court, Straub found that the government interest in 
eradicating HIV/AIDS was as important as its interest in ending prostitution 
and sex trafficking.347  Judge Straub reasoned that the Policy Requirement 
was substantially related to eradicating AIDS/HIV, prostitution, and sex-
trafficking because the policy is “precisely aimed at Congress’s goal.”348  
Congress only authorized federal funds for organizations that shared its 
desire to affirmatively reduce HIV/AIDS behavioral risks, including its 
policy of eradicating prostitution.349  As a result, the Agencies require 
recipients to affirm that they are in fact opposed to prostitution.350 
The Policy Requirement addresses the interest by trying to regulate the 
policies and practices of those using government funds; the Policy 
Requirement is not “so attenuated . . . as to invalidate the condition.”351  As 
agents for the government, the recipients are therefore required to adhere to 
its policy.352  “[T]he Policy Requirement is obviously related to the 
 
 343. Id. (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 
206 (2003)). 
 344. Id. at 265 (“[T]he decision whether to withhold Leadership Act funds from these 
organizations or instead to provide an exemption from the Policy Requirement is precisely 
the kind of policy judgment that Congress, not the courts, is entitled to make.”). 
 345. Id. at 265; see also id. at 238 (majority opinion) (finding that the main purpose was 
based on eradicating HIV/AIDS, not prostitution and sex trafficking). 
 346. Id. at 266 (Straub, J., dissenting) (finding centrality of the viewpoint-discrimination 
to the purpose not determinative). 
 347. Id. at 257. 
 348. Id at 265 (“[T]he Policy Requirement is obviously related to substantive policy goals 
of the Leadership Act—goals beyond, and different from, simply subsidizing private speech 
for its own sake.”). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 264. 
 352. Id. 
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substantive policy goals of the Leadership Act—goals beyond, and different 
from, simply subsidizing private speech for its own sake.”353 
These government interests were still legitimate despite the exemptions 
provided to certain organizations.354  Because organizations can be 
exempted for a variety of legitimate reasons,355 the decision to exempt these 
organizations is even stronger because it involved foreign affairs.356 
III.  HE WHO PAYS THE PIPER CANNOT ALWAYS CALL THE TUNE:  THE 
LEADERSHIP ACT’S POLICY REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE FOUND TO PLACE 
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION ON RECIPIENT NGOS’ FREE SPEECH 
Part III examines the conflict described in Part II and suggests that the 
analysis should depend on whether the condition impermissibly coerces the 
recipient or attempts to suppress a recipient’s unpopular idea.  In doing so, 
it asserts that Judge Straub of the Second Circuit pinpointed the appropriate 
framework for analyzing conditional government subsidies but failed to 
apply the test correctly.  He provided two ways that a conditional subsidy is 
unconstitutional:  (1) the condition operates as a “coercive penalty on the 
exercise of First Amendment rights” or (2) the condition operates to 
suppress a certain viewpoint.357  This framework provides a clear, easy line 
of analysis that would aid future courts in determining unconstitutional 
conditions and should be adopted.   
While this Note agrees with Judge Straub that the Policy Requirement 
neither compels speech nor aims to suppress any recipients unpopular idea, 
this Note contends that the Policy Requirement does not sufficiently limit 
its scope to restrict only the recipient’s government-funded speech; instead 
the Policy Requirement restricts both government-funded and privately-
funded speech.  As a result, the Policy Requirement acts as a coercive 
penalty and ultimately fails heightened scrutiny. 
A.  Compelled Speech Is Not Relevant to the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis 
While the Supreme Court has found that compelled speech is 
impermissible under the First Amendment,358 speech is not compelled when 
it is a condition for receiving a government subsidy.359  While perhaps 
Wooley, Speiser, and Barnette aid the analysis by providing guidance in an 
 
 353. Id. at 265 (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601(23), 7611(a)(12), (a)(12)(J) (2006 & Supp. V 
2011)). 
 354. Id. at 265–66. 
 355. Id. at 266 (describing “diplomatic considerations” as the main legitimate reason for 
exempting an organization).  Congress’s desire to eradicate prostitution may also have been 
an incentive to exempt the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative. Id. at 265. 
 356. Id. at 266. 
 357. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 46, 271 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
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area never dealt with before,360 it certainly seems strange to consider any 
conditional relationship as truly compelled.  Because the recipients are 
never obligated to accept the conditions attached to federal funding, they 
are free to choose alternate methods of funding besides Leadership Act 
funds.  Silence or neutrality can be, in fact, a viable option when speech is 
conditional.361 
B.  The Policy Requirement Acts As a Coercive Penalty 
At its core, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine defines the limits of 
what society, and the law, deems coercive.  Determining what is an act 
compelled by force, however, is difficult to determine because many 
pressures exist that influence one’s decision.  Determining what analytical 
baseline should be used to determine the limits of coercion can be 
complicated as well.362  This is especially true when considering not 
extreme cases, but moderate ones, such as conditional subsidies where the 
government encourages speech in indirect ways. 
The Court has found that an offer is not a threat if the recipient retains the 
option to deny the funds altogether.363 While conditions may contain 
underlying unconstitutional purposes or effects, conditional funds can never 
be compelled in the same way that direct regulation can.364  Stopping the 
analysis there, however, likely would only continue to frustrate the courts’ 
ability to provide a coherent framework of analysis. 
Speiser and its progeny elaborate two ways in which the denial of a 
government benefit can have the same effect as the direct regulation of 
speech.365  As Judge Straub found, funding conditions are unconstitutional 
if they operate as a coercive penalty on the exercise of First Amendment 
rights when they either (1) restrict a recipient’s First Amendment speech 
outside the scope of the recipient’s participation in a government program 
or (2) deny benefits to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled and 
that are independent from those provided by the government program at 
issue.366 
First, the Policy Requirement has prevented any recipient NGO from 
expressing its silence or neutrality outside the scope of the government 
program.  While the Policy Requirement admittedly does not involve a 
monopolistic use of power by the state in the same way that Wooley and 
Barnette did,367 any recipient NGO is severely limited with what it can do 
with any nonfederal private funds outside the scope of the program, to 
 
 360. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 361. But see supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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also Part I.A.2. 
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 365. See supra notes 278–80 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra notes 298–303 and accompanying text. 
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either remain neutral or speak a pro-prostitution message.368  The 
Leadership Act funds are not tied to any particular project as was the case in 
Rust or Regan, where each speaker could speak through alternate subsidiary 
programs that are separate and independent from the project that receives 
funding.369  Instead the Policy Requirement ties the funding to the grantee, 
making a separation based on speech impossible because any grantee would 
be unable to express a privately neutral or pro-prostitution message once it 
has already spoken by adopting the Policy Requirement.  Ultimately, the 
Policy Requirement does leave each recipient in the same position as those 
in Wooley and Barnette:  without any reasonable alternative.  Instead the 
government could simply limit the Policy Requirement to the projects that 
the government specifically funds, not to the grantee itself.  
The Policy Requirement would also fail the second prong because the 
condition denies recipient NGOs the ability to fund other pro-prostitution or 
prostitution-neutral projects with nonfederal funds.370  The affiliate 
organization structure does not solve that problem.371  As the majority 
opinion in Alliance for Open Society indicates, affiliate structures are 
inadequate to provide a sufficient outlet for any recipient to engage in 
privately funded silence.372  The Policy Requirement’s affirmative speech 
mandate becomes a penalty because it applies to the grantee rather than any 
specific project that the grantee executes and provides an inadequate means 
for separating that message independently through an affiliate dual-
structure.373 
The government’s failure to leave adequate alternative channels for 
expression is especially notable when one considers the germaneness of the 
Policy Requirement to the funding received.  The Leadership Act authorizes 
funding not for the purpose of eradicating prostitution or even espousing an 
antiprostitution message; it authorizes funds for HIV/AIDS-, tuberculosis-, 
and malaria-targeted work.  While admittedly the targeted work can involve 
prostitutes, the government has forced NGOs to respond to an issue that 
these NGOs may never have intended to broach.  The Policy Requirement 
forces NGOs with no desire to work with prostitutes or sex-trafficking to 
express a message where they would have otherwise remained neutral.  The 
government can ensure that its monies are tied to the message it wants to 
espouse, but must require a sufficient nexus between the message and the 
monies used. 
Judge Straub argues that the previous cases turned only on whether the 
government limited the scope of its funding to the purpose for which those 
funds were authorized; none of those cases hinged on the affirmative versus 
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negative speech distinction.374  However, this criticism does not adequately 
address the major difference between the Policy Requirement and previous 
conditions.  In Rust and Regan, negative speech requirements were central 
aspects of the condition, and an affiliate organization would allow them to 
speak differently on different projects.  Here no such outlet is possible 
because silence remains impossible once the speaker has spoken. Like the 
Pied Piper who cannot unsing his tune, neither can the NGO disavow the 
Policy Requirement once it has been declared. The condition obliging the 
recipients to speak taints any speech made by any other affiliate 
organization. 
C.  The Policy Requirement Does Not Suppress Any Viewpoint 
Funding conditions that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint are only 
subject to heightened scrutiny when they are (1) “aimed at the suppression 
of dangerous ideas”375 or (2) when they are imposed in the context of a 
program designed to encourage a diversity of views or facilitate private 
speech.376  The Policy Requirement does not aim to suppress pro-
prostitution or prostitution-neutral views from the marketplace of ideas.377 
As Judge Straub acknowledges, Congress could hardly have thought to 
suppress pro-prostitution views by limiting speech for NGOs seeking 
funding for HIV/AIDS work. 378  If that were the case, the restriction would 
hardly prevent the disfavored speech from being sung. 
Nevertheless, the Court has not concluded that the condition need apply 
to the general population at large.  In Speiser v. Randall, for example, the 
loyalty oath was not taken by anyone other than veterans eligible for a 
property exemption.379  This condition did not necessarily suppress all 
speech for those that wanted to advocate for the violent overthrow of the 
government, but the condition was nevertheless found invalid because it 
was found to significantly suppress an idea that was considered 
dangerous—the violent overthrow of the government.380 
While the Policy Requirement has not significantly suppressed the 
speech of the general public because the public continues to be able to 
discuss the issue freely and openly, the groups that are subject to the 
condition are limited in what they can say.  As illustrated by the 
government’s findings which explicitly oppose pro-prostitution 
viewpoints,381 the Policy Requirement arguably attempts to suppress the 
“dangerous” idea of legalizing prostitution or even remaining neutral on the 
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issue.  A narrow conception of the targeted group proves determinative 
when considering whether a condition aims to suppress an idea.  When 
considered as the group of NGOs, the argument that the Policy 
Requirement aims to suppress certain viewpoints becomes stronger; but 
when considered from the standpoint of the public at large, and 
understanding the limited nature of the speech, the Policy Requirement does 
not aim to suppress a dangerous idea. The Policy Requirement aims only to 
reduce a known cause of the HIV/AIDS epidemic: prostitution and sex 
trafficking. 382 
If the government could create a forum to encourage the diversity of 
ideas,383 then the Policy Requirement similarly is not unconstitutional 
because the government need not maintain its neutrality mandate.384  In 
those situations where the government designed a program to use private 
speakers to transmit its own government message, viewpoint discrimination 
is not improper.385 
The Policy Requirement does not encourage a diversity of views from 
private speakers.  The purpose of the Leadership Act, as defined by 
Congress, was very narrow:  to fund NGOs interested in fighting 
HIV/AIDS through an antiprostitution, anti–sex trafficking approach.386  
The government did not seek to establish a fund to encourage a diversity of 
viewpoints about prostitution or sex trafficking. 
As with all policy decisions, Congress made a viewpoint-based decision 
that allocated public resources for fighting HIV/AIDS.  The Leadership 
Act’s funded programs are distinguishable from Rosenberger and Finley,387 
where the programs were designed to encourage a diversity of ideas, as well 
as Velazquez, where the program was designed to facilitate private 
speech.388  Here the purpose of the Leadership Act is to combat HIV/AIDS 
in a particular manner.  It makes no difference that the eradication of sex 
trafficking and prostitution is supplementary to the main goal of the 
Leadership Act.  However counterproductive or ineffectual the policy 
decision may be towards achieving the end result of reducing the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic,389 Congress made a policy choice to espouse an 
antiprostitution, anti–sex trafficking message and is entitled to make sure 
that its message is neither “garbled nor distorted.”390 
This is not, however, an example of the government retroactively 
recasting the Leadership Act’s purpose as one of conveying a message 
against prostitution simply because that would conveniently allow the 
government to compel recipients to affirmatively espouse its point of 
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view.391  Instead the Policy Requirement closely relates to the policy goals 
of the Leadership Act, beyond subsidizing the private speech for its own 
sake.392  The prostitution and sex trafficking concerns are not simply 
redefined after the fact, but were originally included in the findings and 
purpose of the statute itself.393 
The exceptions given to certain organizations do not seem particularly 
troubling either.394  Congress is allowed to exempt organizations that would 
neither garble nor distort the strong antiprostitution message that the U.S. 
government sought to advance, even though that may be the practical effect 
of those exemptions.  A host of political factors could lead to these 
conclusions, including the diplomatic relations between countries and 
institutions upon which the U.S government relies.395  The U.S. diplomatic 
relationship with the United Nations could easily explain why the Act 
exempts all U.N. agencies, for example. 
The judiciary should show deference when it comes to issues of foreign 
affairs.396  The executive and Congress have historically been afforded a 
great deal of deference and duly so.397  Because foreign affairs “uniquely 
demand [a] single-voiced statement of the Government’s views,”398 the 
Leadership Act should only be considered a policy choice, which advocates 
a certain strategy at the expense of another but does not intend to suppress a 
dangerous idea on the marketplace or suppress the viewpoints of certain 
speakers once in a government-created public forum.399 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should adopt the framework of analysis espoused by Judge Straub 
to assess the constitutionality of government subsidies affecting free 
speech.  This Note supports the framework he proposed, which asks 
whether a conditional subsidy suppresses a certain viewpoint or acts as a 
coercive penalty on speech.  A condition acts as a penalty by either 
restricting speech outside of the scope of the government program or 
denying a benefit to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled. 
Alternatively, when the condition aims not to define the limits of federal 
spending, but to suppress certain viewpoints, the condition is 
unconstitutional.  
The application of this analysis to the Leadership Act supports 
concluding that the Policy Requirement unconstitutionally infringes on a 
recipient’s freedom of speech, preventing recipient NGOs from playing 
 
 391. See supra notes 286–88 and accompanying text. 
 392. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 393. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 394. See supra notes 253–355 and accompanying text. 
 395. See supra notes 253–355 and accompanying text. 
 396. See supra notes 249, 356 and accompanying text. 
 397. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
 398. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 399. See supra notes 230–340 and accompanying text. 
 2012] FUNDING CONDITIONS AND FREE SPEECH 1147 
their own pro-prostitution or prostitution-neutral tunes. Because the 
government has an important interest in maintaining a unified message on 
foreign affairs and has determined that prostitution causes the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, the Policy Requirement cannot be considered compelled speech 
or viewpoint suppression.  However, the Policy Requirement prevents a 
recipient from engaging in privately funded silence or neutrality, chills best 
practices for combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and could be achieved 
through a less restrictive alternative.  Consequently, because an HIV/AIDS 
NGO should be free to play its own tune with nonfederal funds, the Policy 
Requirement should be deemed an unconstitutional condition. 
